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Abstract 
 
Brazil’s critical role in South American integration and political crisis management in Latin 
America, as well as its increasing power in international trade, finance, and security 
underscorethat Brazil influence over regional and international affairs.This thesis argues that 
Brazil has leveraged its economic strength and soft power—which it derives from its successful 
domestic social policies and distinguished diplomatic history of promoting international 
cooperation and peaceful conflict—to project regional and international leadership.   
  
Chapter I: Literature Review 
 In The New Brazil,1 Riordan Roett examines Brazil’s development into an emerging 
market and world power.  The author provides a concise overview of Brazil’s political and 
economic history from Portuguese colonization, to independence, industrialization, military rule, 
democratization, and social reform.  He also analyzes Brazil’s regional and international 
leadership in the wake of the 2008 economic downturn.  Roett argues that Brazil’s economic 
growth and political stability are a result of the Real Plan, which enacted reforms that ultimately 
stabilized economic conditions in the country.  Economic stability, Roett claims, allowed 
President Cardoso (and subsequently President Lula) to address national poverty reduction—one 
of Brazil’s most pressing national issues. 
 Brazil’s economic growth has given it an increased stake in the global economy and thus 
established a foundation for that country’s diplomatic activism and burgeoning role in 
international decision making.  Roett frames Brazil’s increased role in international affairs in 
terms of the BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) increasing economic clout relative to 
Western countries and their newfound ability to challenge those countries’ traditional dominance 
of international organizations.  However, as illustrated by its instrumental role within the G20 
throughout the Doha Round of trade negotiations and during the global response to the 2008 
financial crisis, Brazil stands out among the BRICs as a “key spokesperson” and a generator of 
alternative policies for developing countries.2 Roett notes that IMF quota and World Bank voting 
power shifts favoring emerging economies were a major accomplishment of BRIC lobbying, in 
which Brazil played a major part.  
                                                 
1
 Roett, Riordan. 2010. The New Brazil. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C 
2
 Roett, Riordan. 2010. The New Brazil,9 
 Roett credits Brazil’s central role in dispute settlement and regional integration, 
cooperation, and institution building in part to strong leadership by President Lula and 
Itamaraty.3  Furthermore, Roett briefly examines the failings of the Common Market of the 
South (MERCOSUR) and argues that Brazil’s frustrations with the stymied progress of that 
organization (for example the inability to establish a dispute settlement mechanism and 
institutional decision making process) have led it to pursue broader regional initiatives such as 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Latin American and Caribbean Summit for 
Integration and Development (CALC).  Lastly, the author states that Brazil’s obstruction of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and exclusion of the U.S. in UNASUR and CALC 
should not be viewed as anti-American, but rather as “pro-Latin America and the Caribbean in 
the changing twenty-first century.”4 
 In his 2004 book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Nye defines soft 
power as the states’ ability to attract.  He argues that states may reach their desired outcomes 
because other states “admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
prosperity and openness--want to follow it.”5  Moreover, the resources that contribute to a 
country’s soft power are its values, culture, political institutions, internal policies, and the 
manner in which it interacts with others.   
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 Roett, The New Brazil.  The author credits Lula with taking initiative to host conferences for UNASUR and other 
regional initiatives, and formulate regional objectives, such as the creation of the South American Defense Council 
(adopted by UNASUR heads of state during a conference in Brazil in 2008); however,  he details little about 
Itamaraty’s role in that leadership.  I will address the role of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in regional and 
international leadership in a later chapter. 
4
 Ibid, 131 
5
 Nye, Joseph S. Jr.  2004.  Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.  Public Affairs: New York, 5. 
 Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in his memoirs,6 recounts 
Brazilian history since the time of Dom Pedro II until the end of his presidency in 2003.  The 
author provides personal perspective into the role of the military in society, systemic racial and 
economic inequalities, the roots of Brazil’s hyperinflation and national debt and Brazilian 
political culture (for example, Cardoso explores the effects of Brazilian “jeitinho”— or the 
Brazilian way—which he characterizes as “the artful little trick of getting around the system,”7 
on Brazilian democracy. 
 The author also includes a personal account of his economic and social policies while in 
office, including the Real Plan, Bolsa Escola, as well as land reform and AIDS reduction policies 
which I will utilize in my discussion of domestic policy as a Brazilian soft power asset.  
 Hal Brands contends that Brazil’s “grand strategy” under Lula was to “hasten the 
transition to a multipolar order in which international norms and institutions no longer favor the 
developed world at Brazil’s expense.”8  Because Brazil lacks the material capabilities to 
challenge the West’s dominance of international institutions, it must project its influence through 
soft-balancing, coalition building, and skillful multilateral diplomacy.  Such strategies, Brands 
notes, are components of what Robert Keohane refers to as a “middle power” strategy.9  Brands 
holds that Brazil’s middle power strategy was threefold.  In order to dilute U.S. dominance of the 
international system, the Lula Administration promoted adherence to international rules, norms, 
and the use of multilateral forums for decision making.  It lobbied for the G20 to replace the G8 
and united opposition to U.S. agricultural subsidies within the WTO, which stymied the Doha 
Round trade talks.  At the UN, Brazil supported collective security missions, leading the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  It also provided troops in peacekeeping 
                                                 
6
 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique.  2006.  The Accidental President of Brazil.  Public Affairs: New York. 
7
 Cardoso, The Accidental President of Brazil The Accidental President of Brazil, 204. 
8
 Brands, Hal. 2010. “Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy.” Strategic Studies Institute  Monograph 1-76, 12. 
9
 Brands, “Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy,” 17. 
missions in East Timor and elsewhere, and rejected the U.S.’s unilateral invasion of Iraq.  
Strengthening the international economic system and denying legitimacy to the unilateral use of 
force are classic soft-balancing techniques according to Brands, the former because it increased 
representation in economic decision making, and the latter because it raised the diplomatic cost 
of military action which had not been approved by the Security Council.  
 The second aspect of Brazil’s middle power strategy, according to Brands, was the 
cultivation of strategic South-South partnerships to strengthen its influence.  To further increase 
expand the representativeness of the international system, Brazil sought to use the G4 (Japan, 
Germany, India and Brazil) as a mechanism to support its bid for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council.  Of Brazil’s South-South diplomacy, Brands believes that IBSA (India, Brazil, 
South Africa) is the most viable partnership.  That forum is working to increase trade and 
between the three countries and is working in tandem on investment, the environment and 
development projects in Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and other poor countries.  Each country has also 
pledged to support one another’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council.  
 Brazil’s third middle power strategy is to position itself as the leader of a unified South 
America.  Brands refers to this as “regional formation,” a process through which Brazil seeks to 
establish South America as a “distinct geopolitical entity and claim leadership status within that 
entity.”10 This would enable Brazil to act as the recognized representative of the region in 
international forums thus “improving its diplomatic credibility and negotiating capacity.”11 
Moreover, heading a more politically and economically integrated region would further increase 
Brazil’s economic leverage in trade, as it would preside over a larger market. 
 Brazil faces challenges to its regional leadership.  Countries like Chile and Colombia 
have opted for free trade agreements with the United States while Venezuela exploits its oil 
                                                 
10
 Ibid, 24 
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wealth to buy regional influence.  Despite Brazil’s willingness to grant concessions, such as its 
acquiescence in Bolivia’s nationalization of PETROBRAS assets, Brands maintains that Brazil 
will have to “forge consensual arrangements that provide its neighbors with economic and 
political benefits while drawing them deeper into the Brazilian orbit.”12 
 In an article that addresses Brazil’s consensual leadership in South America, Sean W. 
Burges draws on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, which states that to lead, a state must 
convince others to support its ideas and policies and accept them as their own.  Because Brazil is 
limited in its military and economic capabilities, its ability to lead, to a certain extent, depends on 
its ability to generate such support for its proposals.  Burges argues that there are three aspects of 
a “consensual hegemony”—what he describes as a non-coercive order with Brazil positioned at 
the center—in South America: ideas, economics, and security.   
 Hence, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) sought to drum up support for the 
idea that a unified and autonomous zone of cooperation would be beneficial not just for Brazil, 
but for all of South America.  It claimed that cooperation in trade (Mercosur) and infrastructure 
integration (The Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America) would 
advance mutual interests in that it would expand regional firms’ markets for value-added goods, 
buttress smaller countries’ negotiating leverage vis-à-vis Northern states, and create an economy 
of scale capable of attracting the foreign direct investment needed to “revitalize regional 
industries, generate employment, and bring new production technology processes.”13  Burges 
utilizes Brazil’s role in preventing the FTAA through consensus building, proposing ideas, and 
guiding discussions (which he notes is the same strategy Brazil would later use in the G20 to 
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 Ibid, 76  
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 Burges, Sean W. 2008.  “Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War.”  
International Relations 22: 65-84, 76. 
 
rally opposition to U.S. agricultural subsidies during the Doha Round) to illustrate the power of 
Itamaraty’s ideational leadership. 
 The Brazilian regional project succeeded to a certain degree in establishing an economic 
hegemony.  Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as a result of Mercosur, became more dependent 
on Brazil as an export market; Paraguay and Bolivia came to rely significantly on Brazilian 
energy, thus directing “domestic interests in other South American countries towards Brazil.”14 
Yet internal disputes and the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism call into question 
Mercosur’s viability.  Further challenges to Brazilian economic hegemony include Argentina’s 
opposition to Brazil as a regional representative and Venezuela’s rival attempts to lead the 
region. 
 Regarding the security aspect of consensual hegemony, Burges contends that Brazil 
upholds the norms of sovereignty and democracy.  Only when strategic foreign policy goals were 
jeopardized did Brazil take forceful action.  The fact that the Haitian crisis took place during UN 
Security Council reform talks “all but forced Brazil to take a leadership role in a hemispheric 
security crisis if its bid for a permanent [seat] were to retain any credibility.”15 Furthermore, 
defending democracy and autonomy served a dual purpose for Itamaraty.  First, by establishing 
that security operations are the exclusive responsibility of national governments—not foreign 
states or supranational organizations—Brazil has hindered U.S. involvement in security-related 
matters in the region such as narco-trafficking and guerilla activities. Second, national autonomy 
over security, meant that Brazil could call for regional cooperation in pooling resources for 
national governments to combat internal threats, thus circumventing “nationalist responses from 
neighboring countries in response to possible extra-territorial operations of Brazilian police and 
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 Burges, 2008.  “Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War,” 79. 
military forces.”16  Burges concludes by noting that the case of Brazil demonstrates that a 
measure of hegemony can be achieved without coercion and that moreover Brazil exemplifies 
how emerging markets can leverage regional collective action to advance national interests. 
 Burges, in his article in the Bulletin of Latin American Research, claims that during the 
Cardoso Administration, Itamaraty was “explicitly engaged in a leadership project”17 in South 
America, despite Brazilian diplomats’ reluctance to publicly acknowledge such an objective.18  
That project sought to integrate South America and establish that continent as a distinct 
geopolitical and economic unit.  The purpose of Burges’ article, however, is to examine 
Itamaraty’s consensus-generating leadership style.  “The question of leadership,” Burges states, 
relates to a “state’s ability to conceptualize...a vision of the world or regional order -- and 
persuade other countries to embrace the project, an approach that provides some solidity to 
notions of soft power and ideational diffusion.”19 In explaining the reasons for Brazil’s 
leadership style, the author cites that country’s inability to bribe or coerce due to shortage of 
resources (military and economic), historical fears that perceived hegemonic ambitions would 
lead to a coordinated attack against it by its Spanish-speaking neighbors, and the idea that 
regional integration requires cooperation from neighboring countries, which would be 
unobtainable if Brazil had publicly stated its intentions. 
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 Burges, Sean W. 2006.  “Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in the Cardoso Era, 1992-2003.” 
Bulletin of Latin American Research  25: 23-42, 23. 
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 Burges, “Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in the Cardoso Era, 1992-2003.” 27.  Burges cites 
several interviews with Itamaraty in which diplomats discourage the notion that Brazil sought to lead South America 
with the qualification that leadership requires military power and willingness to accept the costs of leadership 
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Felipe Lampreia in an interview in which he stated Brazil’s intention to use its critical mass (ideational creativity, 
market size, and security capacity) to strengthen the idea of South American integration amounts to an explicit 
acknowledgement of Brazil’s desire to lead. 
19
 Ibid, 26 
 To illustrate Brazil’s leadership style, Burges underscores Itamaraty’s role during the 
FTAA talks, especially its utilization of the Rio Group to maintain a collective position against 
that of the U.S.  He further cites its ability to leverage the size of its internal market to form “new 
trade agreements that would advance the continental project and open up international 
markets.”20  Moreover, the IIRSA, which was born out of the 2000 Brasilia Summit of South 
American Presidents, showcases the Gramscian nature of Brazil’s leadership.  Itamaraty 
introduced the topic of regional infrastructure integration for discussion “to mould the thinking 
of other states.”21 
 Burges concludes by highlighting that Brazil’s leadership exemplifies how a middle 
power may gain support for a clearly articulated foreign policy objectives without resorting to 
coercion. However, he notes that the inability or unwillingness to make economic concessions, 
illustrated by Brazil’s policy of contracting only Brazilian engineers, consultants and suppliers 
for Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) funded projects is an obstacle to its leadership of the 
regional integration project. 
 A Woodrow Wilson Center panel discussion on Brazil, entitled “Brazil as a Regional 
Power: Views from the Hemisphere,” features some of the foremost Brazil scholars including 
Riordan Roett, Paulo Sotero, Peter Hakim, and Monica Herz, as well as high level Brazilian 
government officials including former Ambassador to the United States (now Foreign Minister) 
Antonio de Aguiar Patriota.22  The theme of the dialogue, “New Directions in Brazilian Foreign 
Relations,” focuses on the continuities and divergences between the Cardoso and Lula 
Administrations. Patriota clarifies that what distinguishes foreign policy under Lula is its 
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transformational aspects, which he enumerates as increased international reach, such as greater 
interaction with Africa and reaching a strategic partnership with the EU, emphasis on Mercosur 
and improving relations with Argentina, and a more ambitious political-diplomatic campaign to 
democratize international organizations.   
 Herz notes that there is more continuity between Cardoso’s and Lula’s foreign policy 
than the “political leadership...and diplomats would like to admit,”23 such as the belief that Brazil 
should play a larger role in global affairs, efforts to increase its autonomy, and promotion and 
adherence to formal and informal international norms and rules.  What distinguishes the Lula 
Administration, however, is its willingness to “challenge the agenda that leads to the formation 
of international norms.”24    
 De Almeida’s article on Brazil’s diplomacy under President Lula25 is useful in defining 
terms.  He clarifies that Brazil, despite its status as a regional power and growing diplomatic 
reach, cannot be considered a major global power because it lacks military and economic 
capabilities.  Instead, it is an “emerging economy and a power broker.”26  Moreover, De Almeida 
lists “objective criteria” for what makes a “natural” regional leader, which includes “territorial, 
economic and demographic dimensions; size of internal markets; presence in external markets; 
concentration and diversification of investments; level of industrial development”27 and more--
all of which Brazil possesses, he claims. 
 While crediting Lula for establishing a greater role for Brazil in international affairs, De 
Almeida also criticizes Brazilian diplomacy under Lula for its poor human rights credentials 
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 De Almeida, Paulo Roberto. 2010. “Never Before Seen in Brazil: Luis Inacio da Silva’s Grand Diplomacy.” 
Revista Brasileira de Politica Internacional 53: 160-177. 
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(because of its cozy relationship with Iran and “indulgence toward dictators like Fidel Castro”28) 
personalistic nature, its antiquated anti-imperialist ideology, and for its promotion of 
protectionism and import-substitution-industrialization, which the author claims is a direct result 
of the PT’s leading role in foreign policy.  
 The Workers’ Party (PT) coalition publication, “Para o Brazil Seguir Mudando,”29 
outlines President Dilma Roussef’s thirteen “general commitments.”  The last of Dilma’s thirteen 
commitments outlines her governing coalition’s foreign policy, which seeks to defend national 
sovereignty and establish an active Brazilian presence in the world.  Key diplomatic initiatives 
include the promotion of South-South diplomacy (BRIC and IBSA), democratization of 
international organizations (mentioning the UN, IMF, and World Bank), continued dialogue with 
developed and developing countries through the G20, support of human rights, non-intervention, 
and disarmament, and consolidating the implementation of Lula’s 2009 national defense 
strategy.  This government document is useful since it gives a concise synopsis of the current 
administration’s foreign policy objectives. 
 An Economist 2006 article, “Who Leads Latin America?,”30 argues that Brazil’s regional 
leadership would be enhanced if it made efforts to reform its electoral system and party 
accountability (in order to tame corruption), simplify investment rules, invest in infrastructure 
improvements, reduce taxes on businesses, and distance itself from Venezuela.  This article is a 
reminder that there are substantial reforms needed for Brazil to continue to grow economically 
and exercise leadership in Latin America. 
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 Rousseff, Dilma and Michel Temer. “Para o Brazil Seguir Mudando.” Comissao de Programa de Governo da 
Coligacao.  
30
 “Who Leads Latin America?” 2006. Economist 380: 11-11. 
 The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, composed of scholars, 
government officials, and the business and non-profit community, gives a comprehensive 
analysis of Brazil’s growing economy, energy and climate change agenda, role in regional and 
international diplomacy, and its relationship with the U.S.31 
 The section on Brazil’s economy breaks down the strengths and weaknesses to continued 
growth.  As a result of sound economic policies, which have attracted foreign investment, 
growing domestic demand (attributable to responsible redistributive policies), and the booming 
market for Brazil’s agricultural exports driven by China’s and other emerging market countries’ 
demand, Brazil boasts a strong position in the global economy today with continuously positive 
growth prospects for the future.  The Task Force notes that GDP per capita has doubled over the 
past ten years and poverty has been cut nearly in half.  Moreover, the Task Force holds that 
Brazil has leveraged its robust economy to increase its global commercial and diplomatic 
footprint. 
 Nevertheless, reforms are needed.  According to the Task Force, Brazil must redouble its 
efforts to upgrade its infrastructure, which will require labor, pension, and social security reform 
to improve the state’s public ability to finance such projects.  Furthermore, the Task Force 
recommends the simplification of corporate and labor taxes to buttress the country’s ability to 
attract FDI and allow small and medium size businesses to operate more easily.  The Rousseff 
administration must also continue to target inflation and ensure prudent regulation of consumer 
credit to insure against overheating.   
 Brazil’s frequent non-permanent membership on the UN Security Council provides that 
country with a platform for participation on critical international security issues.  With its 
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 Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig. 2011. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.” 
Independent Task Force Report No. 66.  Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations: New York. 
 
growing economic and diplomatic clout, Brazil has demonstrated responsibility for the 
maintenance of regional and international security.  While its command of MINUSTAH best 
exemplifies that responsibility, Brazil is fourteenth in troop contributing countries, and works to 
build security capacity in developing countries such as Guinea-Bissau where it is building a 
police training academy.  The Task Force urges the U.S. to support Brazil’s bid for a permanent 
seat on the Security Council, which it believes would strengthen that institution’s responsibility 
and accountability.  In addition, the Task force calls on Brazil to increase its annual financial and 
troop contributions to the UN to better reflect its active role in that institution.   
  The Task Force establishes that Brazil’s activism within the G20 is the catalyst for its 
increased international economic and financial leadership.  It has successfully used its prominent 
role within that group to increase its voting rights in the IMF and WB, and to rally support 
behind efforts to reduce U.S. agricultural protectionism (which ultimately led to the stalling of 
the Doha Round in 2003).  Furthermore, Brazil’s enterprises, such as Embrapa, Odebrecht, Vale, 
and Petrobras, which were invigorated by capitalization under Lula, have internationalized their 
investments and act as a facet of soft power.  In Africa, for instance, those firms have contributed 
valuable technology transfers, skills training, research and development, and capital. 
 South American energy and infrastructure integration is important for Brazil’s economic 
growth, as its trade with the continent as a whole exceeds that with China or the U.S., its two 
largest individual trading partners.  Establishing South America as a unified regional trading bloc  
would also bolster its negotiating position in trade talks and global economic governance. 
 Cason and Power claim that there is a bias within the international relations literature 
which focuses on the strategic goals of Brazil’s foreign policy and that country’s relationships 
with foreign states. In contrast, Cason and Power discuss how foreign policy making in Brazil 
has changed over the past twenty years, and examine contributing international, regional, and 
domestic factors with equal weight. 
 Cason and Power argue that Itamaraty’s traditional dominance over foreign policy 
making has declined in relation to the role of the president and domestic interest groups since the 
Cardoso administration.32  The authors argue that with democratization came the pluralization of 
civil society and business groups and as a result the increased prominence of the Ministry of 
Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) and other government agencies in relation to 
Itamaraty. 
 Beginning with Cardoso, the president’s role in diplomacy also expanded.  The authors 
argue that this can be attributed to Brazil’s shift from an ISI to a neo-liberal development model 
after the Cold War.  They claim that under import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) “there was 
no need for presidentially-led diplomacy”33 since that model prioritized the development of 
domestic industry and sought to replace foreign imports with domestically produced goods.  The 
adoption of market reforms changed Brazil’s development orientation from “inward to outward,” 
and forced presidents to “calculate their moves on a whole range of policies (e.g., industrial, 
trade, and macroeconomic) with the international environment in their minds.”34  The authors 
highlight the top-down nature of the formation of Mercosur under President Collor as one of the 
first examples of presidential leadership, noting that business and civil society opposed its 
creation.  Cardoso and Lula’s subsequent leadership and investment of political capital in that 
organization made it a “crucial element of Brazil’s new development strategy.”35 Moreover, the 
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reputation of Cardoso as Latin America’s leading statesman and Lula as the voice of the 
downtrodden advanced the presidentialization of foreign policy. 
 In terms of the impact that presidential activism has had on foreign policy and diplomacy, 
the authors conclude that Brazilian foreign policy has become less strategic and more 
ideological, citing Brazil’s acknowledgement of Bolivia’s right to nationalize its energy 
resources in spite of that action’s detriment to Brazil’s economic interest.  Cason and Power 
explain the infusion of ideology into Brazil’s diplomatic agenda as a PT attempt to cater to its 
left wing base since it has implemented neo-liberal policies domestically.   
 In his Oxford University Press articles, Andrew Hurrell juxtaposes the Lula 
Administration’s “pessimistic” view of the international system with its “belief that there is 
scope for an activist and assertive foreign policy.” 36  Seeking to assert itself into a hegemonic 
system, Brazil has formed strategic relationships with other rising powers to increase its 
bargaining power and reduce international unipolarity. To further bolster its national autonomy, 
Brazil has emphasized the pursuit of developing nuclear technological capacity, and sought to 
maintain its industrial base (which Hurrell explains as the reason for which Brazil thwarted Free 
Trade Area of the America talks). 
 Brazilian diplomacy is characterized by soft power.  Hurrell refers to Brazil’s “diplomatic 
GNP,” or its capacity for building coalitions, activism within international organizations, and 
ability to frame claims for greater representational fairness (such as its bid for a seat on the 
Security Council and promotion of a global hunger fund) as beneficial to the rest of the 
developing world.  It is at the regional level, however, where the limits of the Lula 
Administration’s foreign policy are most visible. Hurrell claims that Lula’s activism was 
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excessively personalistic and voluntaristic, and notes that there has been a conspicuous gap 
between rhetoric and actual achievements.   
 For instance, while Lula was verbally committed to strengthening Mercosur, his 
administration was unwilling to invest in strengthening that organization’s institutional structure. 
Furthermore, Hurrell states that if the measurement of success of Brazil’s regional strategy is the 
creation of a regional bloc “with a significant degree of internal cohesion and a capacity to 
increase the region’s power in the world, then...the strategy has failed.”37  While South American 
countries’ economies and infrastructure have become significantly more interconnected since 
Mercosur’s inception, the widespread perception that market reforms have failed, and the revival 
of economic nationalism (in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador for example) remain barriers to 
further regional integration. 
 Hurrell also points out the limits of South-South diplomacy, noting that the bulk of 
Brazil’s trade is with the industrialized world, China’s unwillingness to support Brazil’s 
candidacy for a Security Council seat, and furthermore that efforts to gain support for that 
ambition have led it to diminish its commitment to human rights.  Such tensions in the objectives 
of its foreign policy are likely to persist, and reflect Brazil’s multifaceted identity and strategy as 
a leader of the South, a bridge between North and South, and as a rising power which employs 
South-South unity and claims to represent global justice for its own welfare. 
 According to Soares de Lima and Hirst, Brazil’s domestic efforts to address income 
inequality and its activist foreign policy are “two sides of the same coin,” and hence that that 
country’s “international confidence and credibility” derives from its successful democratic 
consolidation and economic policy reform.  Thus, political and economic stability, combined 
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with efficient and effective redistributive social policies are fundamental to Brazil’s legitimacy-
based leadership in international affairs. 
 Soares de Lima and Hirst argue that from the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 
to the formation of the G20 during the Doha Round in 2003, Brazil has presented itself as a 
mediator between developed and developing countries, “defending the rights of the latter, and, 
simultaneously, positioning itself to assume a status equivalent to the former.”38  In international 
trade and development negotiations since World War II, however, Brazil has consistently 
favored the third world’s positions.  It opposed the GATT’s free market principles, favoring rules 
that benefitted developing countries, such as most favored nation status as a way of offsetting 
developed countries’ unilateral protectionism.  The authors note that while the unity of the G77 
withered in the Uruguay Round, the formation of the G20 in Cancun represented a revival of the 
“Third World coalition spirit.”39  Given its traditional emphasis on procedural issues regarding 
market fairness within the WTO and the competitiveness of its agricultural exports, the G20’s 
concentration on obtaining access to developed countries’ agricultural markets presented Brazil 
with an opportunity to reassert itself as a mediator between “weak” and “strong.”40  Moreover, 
Brazil sees its function as a mediator and efforts to increase Security Council representativeness 
as legitimate ground for it to obtain a permanent seat on that body. 
 The authors hold that Brazil’s identity has shifted from Latin American to South 
American largely because policy makers in that country doubted the conception of Latin 
America as a unit after the creation of NAFTA.  The Lula Administration has prioritized South 
American regional integration.  Brazil’s regional policy encompassed three assumptions: First, 
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that a greater regional presence would increase political ties with Argentina; second, that deeper 
involvement would promote greater regional stability: and third, that integration would foster 
neighbors’ support for it to represent the region in international affairs.   
 The first assumption has succeeded to a certain degree, as Mercosur has deepened 
investment, cultural, educational, and inter-societal ties between the two countries; however 
Brazil’s unwillingness to make concessions on investment policies has led to “bitter 
disagreements” and “postponed...a successful revitalization of Mercosur.”41  Regarding the 
second assumption, while Brazilian mediation has contributed to reducing regional political 
tension and insecurity and promoting democracy (in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Haiti, etc.), the tumult of regional politics has exceeded its capacity according to the authors.  
The third assumption, as evidenced by difficulty obtaining support for director-general of the 
WTO and Colombia and Argentina’s  unwillingness to back Brazil’s Security Council bid, has 
proved overly sanguine. 
 In their 2005 Third World Quarterly article, Alden and Vieira’s discuss the trilateral 
diplomatic partnership between Brazil, India, and South Africa that emerged from cooperative 
efforts between those countries during trade negotiations at Cancun in 2003.42  The purpose of 
that partnership has been to promote cooperation on issues such as defense, multilateral 
diplomacy, international trade, technology, and social development.  The three countries have 
also issued joint statements supporting Security Council reform, thereby legitimizing “their own 
claims to any regional allocation of new permanent seats.”43  Furthermore, the three countries’ 
leading positions within respective regional trading blocs has facilitated efforts to establish inter-
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regional trade agreements, and have formed a trilateral business council to increase the 
competitiveness of their multinational corporations.  Most significant, according to the authors, 
is the partnerships’ function as a “stepping stone towards broader cooperation among developing 
countries.”44   
Long-term prospects for the success of IBSA largely rest on the economic profitability of 
the relationship for each country.  The authors state that the potential economic benefits for each 
are modest in comparison to regional opportunities.  Significant barriers to economic integration 
between the three include difficulties in negotiating tariff reductions (in India especially) and the 
objection of the business and agricultural export community, right-wing parties, liberal segments 
of the foreign ministry, academics, and business associations in Brazil, which oppose deeper ties 
with the South, citing the comparatively more lucrative prospects of trade deals with the U.S. and 
the EU.  
 Hunter notes that during its time in opposition, the PT contributed to the consolidation of 
democracy by acting as loyal opponent (never undermining the political system), and served as a 
legitimate and non-violent channel for social demands such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais sem Terra (Landless Movement).  It also diminished fragmentation by subsuming other 
leftist parties.45  The PT appealed to voters based on its programs, values and ideals, and 
eschewed clientelism and individualistic candidate appeals (in other words, voters identified with 
the PT, not just Lula).  Regarding policy, the PT promoted land redistribution in favor of the 
poor, opposed privatization of state-owned enterprises, strong labor laws, economic nationalism, 
government transparency, and greater citizen autonomy and involvement in public decision-
making. 
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 The PT also stood out as a disciplined party.  It sought uniformity in its party platform at 
all levels of government and retained high levels of cohesion in party voting.  The PT preserved 
its identity by allying strictly with parties of the left.  Furthermore, PT politicians generally 
shared dedication to the party’s values and program.  In short, throughout the duration of its time 
as an opposition party since the return to democracy until Lula’s election in 2003, the PT 
maintained its reputation as a transparent organization representing good governance. 
 Hunter explains that as a part of its bid to capture presidency, the PT was forced to move 
to center to capture a larger segment of the popular vote. Lula sought to convince his party to 
reform its rigid standards for forming alliances, and in 2002 the party allied with the Liberal 
Party (PL)—whose constituency consists of a mix of evangelicals and affluent businessmen. 
This was controversial within the PT and led to a distancing between Lula and his party. Other 
explanations for the PT’s moderation are that its experience governing at local level made it 
more practical, and alternatively, that changes in the global economy made market reforms 
inevitable.   
During the 1998 election, the PT accepted market reforms, the need to honor public debts 
(IMF), and eliminated “socialism” from its program.  It also adopted a political marketing 
strategy to change the party’s image and reformed campaign finance methods to increase its 
funding. 
 The PT’s first term in office has been dubbed “Cardoso’s third term” as the party ran a 
fiscal surplus, maintained high interest rates to check inflation, reformed pensions, and expanded 
upon Cardoso’s redistributive social policies.  Unfortunately, however, the PT lost its reputation 
as a clean player after the “mensalão” scandal (monthly bribes to obtain federal deputies’ support 
for legislation), and kickbacks on government contracts that went toward the PT’s campaign 
financing. 
 In short, the PT moved toward the center in a bid to win the 2003 election, and is now 
much less a party of the left than during its years in opposition.  According to Hunter, the 
transition of the PT to a status quo party has lessened its ability to strengthen the party system 
and hence Brazilian democracy.  Moreover, the PT’s low popularity in Congress reflects public 
disillusionment with its conduct in office. 
 Santos and Vilarouca conclude that Mainwairing’s concerns that presidentialism 
combined with an open list proportional representation electoral system would foster weak, 
undisciplined parties, personalized politics and governability have turned out to be overblown.46  
The claim that the centrality of the executive branch paired with party leaders’ control over the 
legislative agenda have served to counteract against legislators’ pursuit of parochial interests. 
The presidency’s control over administrative and budget issues, along with its ability to enact 
laws by decree and request urgency for the passage of bills (legislative bills take three times as 
long as executive bills to pass) serve to mitigate against government gridlock.   
 A high percentage of voters, despite the large number of political parties and quantity of 
individual candidates on ballots, are able to distinguish parties despite their ideological 
convergence, which suggests that the electoral system is competitive. Nevertheless, the authors 
note that the high rate of politicians switching parties is problematic (although this usually occurs 
among parties within the same coalition), and recommend implementation of legislation that 
would penalize such behavior and encourage parties to take greater care in their selection of 
candidates and heighten their concern about their party’s reputation. 
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 In his chapter on the reduction of ideological cleavages in Brazilian politics, Timothy J. 
Power discusses three traditional ideological cleavages among the Brazilian political class which 
have diminished over time since the return to democracy.47 The first—economic management—
has attenuated since the Real Plan as parties across the political spectrum have formed a 
consensus around successful neoliberal policies.  This has narrowed the ideological distance 
between parties and served to erode political polarization.   
The second cleavage, what the author terms “authoritarian debris versus democratic 
renewal” as during the Sarney period, the military retained direct cabinet representation and the 
right to intervene to protect internal order due to the insistence of right wing parties.  Between 
1990 and 2005, Power finds that parties of the right stabilized their commitment to democratic 
rule.  Nevertheless, according to Power’s survey of the political elite, more than 50% still believe 
that the armed forces should have the constitutional right to intervene to maintain internal order.  
 The third cleavage is political institutions (the extent to which politicians favor individual 
liberty versus party-centered politics).  Power concludes that while Brazilian politicians are 
reluctant to move towards a party-centered system, support for the open-list has diminished from 
1990 to 2005. 
 Ames, Baker, and Renno find that there is an impressive amount of “issue voting,” 
(voters choosing politicians based on the quality of that candidate’s program will affect the 
public welfare).48  The large number of political parties and unwieldy amount of candidates on 
ballots (a product of Brazil’s open list proportional representation electoral system) confounds 
voters in legislative elections only.  Yet fragmentation is not an issue in national presidential 
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elections, which the authors determine based on the fact that the previous four out of five of the 
previous elections have been contests between two parties: the PDSB and the PT.49  The authors 
also find that clientelism (politicians exchanging jobs or gifts for votes) was not a significant 
problem during the 2002 election, as only 5% of voters reported such activity.   
 During legislative elections, in contrast, voters tend to base decisions on “pork,” or 
promises to build public works projects. This leads to perverse incentives for deputies, 
encouraging them to cast votes on national legislation based on the likelihood that it will allow 
them to access federal funding for their particular projects.  The authors believe that this can 
have negative effects for fiscal discipline and economic efficiency. 
 According to Amaral, Kingstone, and Krieckhaus, Lula’s implementation of neoliberal 
parties, despite his campaign against them, reflects the need to please foreign investors and 
creditors and retain capital in the country.50  The need for foreign investment curtails 
macroeconomic policymaking autonomy for the political left in Brazil. When Lula took office, 
Brazil was on the verge of default, and negative investor sentiment had put downward pressure 
on the real and upward pressure on national debt.  Lula, despite his campaign against neoliberal 
policies, was thus forced to reassure investor confidence with the “Carta ao povo Brasileiro” 
(Letter to the Brazilian People), in which he informed the public that neoliberal policies were 
necessary to protect the economy.  In fact, according to the authors, Lula, as a leftist was forced 
to move his policies farther to the right than those of a conservative candidate to secure the 
confidence of foreign investors, who generally distrust parties of the left.   
 The authors make the case that regulatory policy should be an area where left wing 
parties retain some autonomy.  Yet despite the PT objective to gain more control over regulatory 
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agencies (which oversee privatized utility companies) it did not succeed in doing so.  Internally 
divided, the party heeded Finance Minister Palocci’s position: to respect the agencies’ political 
independence in order to maintain those companies’ attractiveness to foreign investors.   
The authors conclude that the economic policy making constraints which face the left could lead 
to voter disillusionment and to the deterioration of the quality of democracy and the legitimacy 
of democratic institutions. 
 Andre observes that there has been remarkable continuity between the Cardoso and Lula 
administrations.51  Lula fused Bolsa Escola with three other conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs (Auxilio Gas, Bolsa Alimentacao, Cartao Alimentacao) to create Bolsa Familia under 
the Ministerio para o Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome).  Under Bolsa Familia, low 
income families with children under sixteen receive a stipend which is linked to school 
attendance and various health measures. After municipalities screen for eligibility, beneficiaries 
receive debit cards and withdraw funds directly from the National Savings Bank.  Thus, because 
funds are distributed from the federal government directly to recipients without state 
involvement, the opportunities for corruption are minimal. 
 Bolsa Familia also reflects the strengthened fiscal position of the Brazilian federal 
government after Cardoso’s reforms (particularly due to the Fiscal Reform Act) during the 
1990s, which reigned in state spending, augmented federal revenue, and led to presidential 
control over poverty reduction and the universal implementation of the program (nearly all 
municipalities participated in the program by 2004).  The authors note, furthermore, that the 
impact and the efficiency of the program have been striking.  They credit the program with the 
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reduction of Brazil’s Gini Coefficient from .60 in 1998 to .57 in 2004 while absorbing only one 
percent of GDP. 
 Anthony Pereira underscores how public insecurity undermines the quality of Brazilian 
democracy, especially for low-income individuals.52  While Brazil has achieved political and 
macroeconomic stability, it has failed to curb violent crime.  The homicide rate has increased per 
100,000 from 11.7 in 1980 to 28.5 in 2002. Long borders which are permeable to drug 
trafficking and organized crime, the five fold rise in youth unemployment between 1979 and 
1998, and a dysfunctional criminal justice system which permits impunity all reinforce Brazil’s 
high homicide rate.  
 The author divides public security problems into three categories: Public sector 
fragmentation, police politicization, and the privatization of security. The first derives from 
states’ lack of accountability to the federal government on security matters.  States obtain 
funding from the National Secretariat for Public Security but do not comply with that agency’s 
initiatives.  Moreover, the division between civilian and military police weakens the 
government’s ability to effectively respond to crime. Military police are responsible for 
patrolling the streets while civil police handle criminal investigations.  Unfortunately, there is a 
severe informational and organizational disconnect between the former and the latter.  Military 
police do not share a common dispatch with civil officers and live separately on military 
barracks.  “This division of labor,” Pereira says, “leads to competition and duplication of 
effort.”53  Furthermore, the military police lack sophisticated police training and employ 
repressive tactics (there were 1063 extrajudicial killings in Rio in 2006).54  The civilian police 
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lack managerial oversight, and as a result lack the incentive to write quality police reports and 
send them to the district attorney’s office within a reasonable amount of time.  Overall, this leads 
to a low level of public prosecutions and a lack of public transparency and accountability.  In 
addition, mayors and governors of different political parties do not cooperate. 
 Politicians in Brazil utilize security institutions as political tools.  Parties staff the 
National Secretariat for Public Security with politically loyal officials, which contributes to a 
lack of public security policy continuity between administrations.  Moreover, police promotions 
are also based on loyalty and politicians retain the ability to transfer “troublesome” officers, 
especially those that investigate them or their party. 
 Safety is not a public good in Brazil; it is accessible only to those that can afford to hire 
private security forces.  There are more than twice as many private security guards (many of 
which are off-duty or retired police officers) than there are civil and military police.  This creates 
a perverse incentive for security officials to manufacture violence to increase the demand and 
price for private protection, which has led to the blurring of the line between the police and 
organized crime.  Moreover, routinized prison torture and police repression weaken Brazil’s 
human rights reputation.  
 Ollie A. Johnson debunks the myth that Brazil is a multi-racial democracy.  He asserts 
that blacks and mulattos in Brazil have been marginalized in education, employment, and 
upward mobility.55  Due to dogged efforts by black rights’ organizations (the Black Experimental 
Theatre and the Unified Black Movement) racial inequality has inserted itself into the public 
discourse.  Currently, affirmative action in Brazil is a salient and polarizing debate.  While some 
universities have enacted racial quotas for blacks and mulattos, many prestigious universities, 
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such as the Universidade de Sao Paulo and the Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro have 
refused to do so, and many prominent academics have voiced vociferous opposition to the 
adoption of affirmative action policies.  Overall, the author concludes that the return to 
democracy, persistent black activism, and leftist electoral victories has created a political and 
intellectual environment more open to Afro-Brazilians. 
 Through an intergenerational study of favela residents in Rio de Janeiro, Janet Perlman 
determines that those residents’ sense of disenfranchisement since re-democratization in Brazil 
has worsened due to deteriorated public security, exposure to violence, and exclusion from jobs, 
schools, etc.56  Furthermore, the urban poor have little to no influence over elected officials and 
are generally disappointed with democracy.  Thus, “Brazilian democracy has a long way to go in 
terms of consolidation, equality under the law, protection of its citizens from violence, and 
meeting the needs of the underclass.”57  In short, the inability to provide security, sufficient 
employment, education, and political access for low income citizens undermines their support for 
democracy.  Perlman concurs with a recent UNDP study which confirms nostalgia for the safety 
of order under authoritarian rule. 
 Jean Krasno claims that by virtue of its geographic and economic size, population, vital 
environmental resources, diplomatic leadership and democratic consolidation, Brazil is a pivotal 
state in Latin America.58   Krasno notes that Itamaraty has a long history of negotiating peaceful 
solutions to conflict, a tradition which began with Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1902-1912), 
who successfully negotiated several border disputes with neighboring countries.  That tradition 
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has been expanded to beyond its own borders.  Krasno cites the examples of Brazil’s role in 
helping prevent a military coup in Paraguay, sending peacekeeping troops to the Ecuador-Peru 
border during a crisis over a long time border dispute, and its initiation of a treaty on regional 
cooperation on the use of the Amazon Basin, which was signed by eight foreign ministers.   
 Brazilian diplomacy was also crucial in establishing Latin America as a nuclear free zone 
(the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and was instrumental in convincing Cuba to sign that treaty.   In 
conjunction with its neighbor and long time rival, Argentina, Brazil created the Agency for 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a mutual inspection regime, which was an 
essential step in normalizing relations between the two countries. In addition, Brazil has been a 
leader in the Rio Group, an informal diplomatic forum committed to promoting peace, 
development, and democracy in the region, and also plays an active role in Portuguese speaking 
countries such as Mozambique and East Timor. 
 Brazil’s democratic consolidation is imperative for Latin America.  As Latin America’s 
“most populous and largest country,” if Brazil were to revert to military rule, Krasno maintains, 
“Military regimes could be emboldened to take over in other countries, perhaps even with the 
tacit support of Brazil.”59  As noted by Perlman and Pereira in Democratic Brazil Revisited, the 
problems of impunity and unequal justice continue to blight the quality of democracy and should 
be addressed by public policy to assure continued popular support for democratic governance. 
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 Scholars concur that Brazil’s growing economic weight is the root of its newfound 
influence in international affairs.60  According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Brazil’s 
“economic prowess places it in a leadership position in Latin America and in the world and 
boosts the region’s strategic importance globally.”  Brazil has the world’s fifth-largest population 
and landmass.  It also ranks as the world’s eighth-largest economy and is projected to become 
the fifth-largest by 2016.  Additionally, among non-OECD countries, Brazil ranks second in 
foreign direct investment behind China.61   
 As a leading producer of hydro-power and biofuels, and with the possible development of 
extensive off-shore pre-salt oil reserves, Brazil has reduced its susceptibility to oil shocks (the 
1973 oil embargo was a principal cause of Brazil’s national debt and hyperinflation during the 
1980s).  Further sheltering it from external shocks is Brazil’s well-diversified economy.  While it 
is a leading exporter of primary goods,62 Brazil also has a competitive industrial sector, which 
produces aircraft, automobiles, consumer durables, machinery and equipment, computers,63 and 
accounts for about one third of GDP.  Such diversification shields Brazil’s economy from swings 
in international market prices for primary goods. 
 Underscoring the resilience of its economy, Brazil emerged from the 2008 economic 
downturn relatively unharmed,64 in large part due to prudent policies carried out under the 
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Cardoso and Lula administrations which stabilized Brazil’s currency, built up foreign reserves, 
tamed chronic inflation through privatization of industry and fiscal responsibility, and 
strengthened its banking system.65  Reflecting investor confidence in the stability of Brazil’s 
economy and political system, all major credit rating agencies have upgraded Brazil’s debt to 
investment grade status, which, as Roett notes, allows Brazil to borrow on more favorable terms, 
and helps mitigate that country’s vulnerability to increases in international interest rates and 
fluctuations in the value of the dollar and real.66   
 The strength of its economy and financial system67 in the wake of the 2008 recession 
have bolstered Brazil’s leadership within international economic organizations,68 landing it a 
position among global powers at the G-20.  A Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task 
Force report describes Brazil as a “natural leader” within the G-20, and notes that it succeeded in 
using that institution as a vehicle to increase voting rights for itself and other emerging 
economies within the IMF and World Bank and push for equitable access to industrialized 
countries’ agricultural markets.  During the Doha Round69 of trade negotiations at the WTO, 
Brazil used its leadership position within the G-20 to position itself as representative of 
developing country’s interests and rally opposition to U.S. and European agricultural 
protectionism. Undoubtedly, Brazil’s increased economic weight has translated into influence 
over international economic decision-making.  
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 Along with its activism in international economic organizations, Brazil’s activism on the 
UN Security Council, along with its command of MINUSTAH, a Chapter Seven operation, and 
involvement in several other UN peacekeeping missions70 demonstrates its willingness to use 
force to maintain international peace and security.   This marks a break with past foreign policy 
in Brazil, which embraced the principle of non-intervention. 
A 2010 Economist article notes that, although Brazil has long been active in peacekeeping 
missions,71 it eschewed forcible Chapter Seven interventions, espousing respect for national 
sovereignty. That policy change, explains Monica Herz, a professor at the Pontificia 
Universidade do Rio de Janeiro, is due to the fact that “Brazil’s elite thinks peacekeeping is part 
of the price you have to pay to be among the nations who make the rules.”72  In other words, the 
Brazilian government hopes that, if and when permanent Security Council membership expands, 
its leadership in the maintenance of international peace and security will bolster its qualifications 
for a seat.  Further exemplifying its security leadership, Brazil opened a peacekeeping school in 
Rio de Janeiro (Centro de Instrucao de Opera de Paz) in 2005.  According to the Economist, the 
school has trained 15,000 troops, and is contributing to the modernization of the Brazilian army73 
and the pacification of Rio de Janeiro favelas.74 
 Brazil has also played a fundamental role as diplomat in the mediation of regional 
conflicts.  During the 1990s, Brazil assisted in preventing a military coup in Paraguay and 
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mediated a border dispute between Ecuador and Peru,75 and since 2003, has intervened in 
political crises in Venezuela (as part of the Group of Friends of Venezuela), Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador,76 Haiti, and most recently in Honduras after a military coup ousted democratically 
elected president Manuel Zelaya.77   
 In Latin America, Brazil has been instrumental in the creation and leadership of regional 
political and economic organizations, including Mercosur, Unasur, and the Rio Group.    
Mercosur is a free trade bloc between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, with five 
associate members: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.  Now the fourth-largest trading 
bloc in the world (after the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur was created by 
the Treaty of Asuncion.  While the treaty succeeded in advancing regional economic integration 
through the reduction of trade barriers between members and establishing a limited customs 
union, it has not resulted in a common market (free movement of capital and labor).78    
 Despite Lula’s verbal commitment to strengthening Mercosur, that organization is “far 
more divided than any time in history.” The lack of a dispute resolution mechanism, and the 
pending accession of Venezuela, a non-democratic country which opposes free trade, could 
further dilute the strength of the organization.79   Moreover, the “widely perceived failures of 
economic liberalism...narrowness of electoral democracy, and a powerful resurgence of 
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economic nationalism”80 in the region remain substantial barriers to further economic 
integration.   
 According to a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report, Mercosur and Unasur are 
not only instruments for regional economic and political integration, but also a key part of 
Brazil’s ambition to establish the region as “an attractive trade bloc and global strategic actor, 
with [itself] as its anchor.”81  Despite increased trade ties and infrastructure integration with its 
neighbors, Brazil has been unable to leverage increased economic cooperation into a bloc of 
regional support for its leadership in global affairs, as Argentina and other neighbors reject the 
idea of Brazil as a regional representative, remaining skeptical that it has their interests in 
mind.82 
 Brazil was critical in the 2004 creation of Unasur.  That organization “aims to create a 
single South American market and to foster economic and infrastructure cooperation and 
development”83 and in 2008, Brazil spearheaded the creation of the South American Defense 
Council, a sub-organization of that organization which seeks to enhance regional security 
cooperation.  The organization has served as a multilateral alternative to the OAS for mediating 
regional conflicts, such as the police uprising in Ecuador and tensions between Colombia and 
Venezuela in 2010.84 
 The Rio Group was an informal coalition of Latin American states that arose in 1986 
from regional cooperation on the Central American peace process.  The objectives of the group 
included regional coordination of common policy positions on international issues, promoting 
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improvement in the function of regional integration organizations, presenting solutions to 
regional conflicts, and to promoting cooperation on social, economic, and technological 
development.85  Brazil was able to leverage its position in the Rio Group to generate support for 
its foreign policy positions and curtail U.S. dominance in South America. For example, during 
the FTAA negotiations, Itamaraty used Brazil’s presidency of that organization to coordinate 
support from Argentina for its trade positions (which contradicted those of the U.S.).  This 
ultimately led to the failure of the talks.86 
 The Rio Group has now been superseded by the creation of the Latin American and 
Caribbean Summit (CELAC).  While still in its “early stages of formation, CELAC,” according 
to a Council on Foreign Relations task force, “would be the first formal association of states to 
include every Latin American and Caribbean nation and exclude the United States and 
Canada.”87 
 Successful economic reform has also enabled Brazil to bolster its legitimacy-based 
leadership, or what Joseph Nye would refer to as “soft power.”  Nye’s theory of soft power holds 
that “intangible assets such as an attractive personality...institutions, and a vision that are seen as 
legitimate or having moral authority” are cost-effective means of exercising power.88  Brazil’s 
soft power emanates both from its domestic and foreign policies.   
 Domestically, stable public finances and political consensus on market reforms have 
allowed Brazil to prioritize the promotion of political transparency, anti-corruption and poverty 
reduction.  The new Brazilian government, under President Dilma Rousseff has taken a strong 
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stance against corruption, and has dismissed several prominent government officials for alleged 
misconduct.89  The administration also recently passed two important pieces legislation—one 
which seeks to promote public access to state documents, and another which will establish a truth 
commission to shed light on state-sponsored human rights abuses that occurred during the 
military dictatorship.90   
 Economic growth, innovative and efficient cash transfer program (“Bolsa Familia”), 
along with cheap credit and increased minimum wages have combined to reduce Brazil’s Gini 
Coefficient from .61 to .54 since 200191 and have lifted thirty million people out of poverty into 
the lower middle class between 2003 and 2009.92  Bolsa Familia, a national conditional cash 
transfer program which seeks to reduce poverty and inequality as well as the “inter-generational 
transmission of poverty”93 by conditioning transfers on compliance with school attendance and 
health requirements demonstrates Brazil’s commitment to that effort.   
 The largest program of its size, Bolsa Familia reaches eleven million families.94 Its 
success95 has attracted significant attention from Latin American policy makers.  Mexico and 
several other Latin American countries have adopted programs replicated on Brazilian municipal 
conditional cash transfer programs.96  For example, as a 2010 Economist article on Brazilian 
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foreign aid notes, “One of the most successful post-earthquake initiatives in Haiti is the 
expansion of Lèt Agogo (Lots of Milk, in Creole), a dairy co-operative, into a project 
encouraging mothers to take their children to school in exchange for free meals.”97  That 
program, financed by the Brazilian government, is modeled after Bolsa Familia and serves as a 
clear illustration of Brazil’s legitimacy, and its ability to impact other states through the 
attractiveness and ingenuity of its policies. 
 According to Soares de Lima and Hirst, Brazil’s domestic efforts to address income 
inequality and its activist foreign policy are “two sides of the same coin,” in other words, 
that country’s “international confidence and credibility”98 derive from its successful democratic 
consolidation and economic policy reform.  The incorporation of its domestic social policies into 
its foreign aid programs, such as in Lèt Agogo, reflect Brazil’s confidence in its policies.   The 
reach of Brazilian soft power extends beyond the Western Hemisphere, notably in Africa.  This 
will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Five on Brazil’s international leadership.   
 As scholars confirm, Brazil has leveraged its robust economy to expand the reach of its 
global diplomacy.99  Diplomacy is an integral component of Brazilian soft power.  According to 
De Almeida, Brazil’s diplomatic strength is its best mechanism “for projecting power abroad,” 
and claims that its “‘diplomatic GDP’ is greater than its economic GDP, and the latter is 
certainly greater than its ‘military’ GDP.”100  Moreover, international relations scholars praise 
Brazil’s Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) for its world-class diplomats.101  Brands notes, for 
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example, that “Itamaraty is the best diplomatic service in Latin America, and its representatives 
receive rigorous professional and linguistics training.”102   
 To understand what makes Itamaraty the best diplomatic service in Latin America 
demands both a comprehensive examination of the institution’s historical development. As 
Krasno notes, Itamaraty has a long history of negotiating peaceful solutions to conflict, a 
tradition which began with Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1902-1912), who successfully 
negotiated several border disputes with neighboring countries.103  Rio Branco, according to Celso 
Lafer, was instrumental in inspiring “the style of diplomatic behavior [which] characterizes 
Brazil,” which Lafer describes as the promulgation of cooperation and adherence to international 
law, or “the capacity to ‘de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda, that is, to reduce conflicts, 
crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock.”104  A more thorough analysis of Brazil’s 
diplomatic leadership, therefore, should link the origins of Itamaraty’s ideological and 
institutional development, with the training of its diplomats and internal management in order to 
provide a more comprehensive explanation for its dynamism in trade negotiations, conflict 
mediation, and activism in international organizations (the WTO and the UN for example).    
  As noted, along with steady economic growth, Brazil’s innovative efforts to reduce 
poverty through social programs are an example of its soft power appeal; various countries have 
attempted to replicate Brazil’s programs domestically. Brazil’s success in lifting thirty million 
people from poverty, notwithstanding, that country remains one of the most unequal societies in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.  Brazil’s Human Development Index (HDI) ranking—a 
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measurement that accounts for education, health, and economic prosperity105 is .699, placing it 
73rd out of 169 countries in the UNDP Human Development Report.  By comparison to the 
regional average, Brazil’s HDI score improvement since 1980 lags: The average country in Latin 
America/Caribbean has progressed from .578 to .706.106   
 Moreover, perhaps most concerning, incessantly high rates of violent crime and 
insecurity prevents society--especially poor shanty town dwellers, or faveleiros—from reaping 
the benefits of democracy and economic development.  According to Arias, a perverse 
interaction between drug traffickers, the state, and civil society organizations enables traffickers 
to maintain state and social support for their control over favelas (shanty towns).107 Thus, the 
Brazilian government’s inability to provide security, as well as sufficient employment, 
education, and political representation for its underclass undermines democracy.  Furthermore, 
widespread human rights abuses by military police, prison torture, and rampant impunity108 are 
issues that could taint Brazil’s image abroad and undermine its soft power leadership capacity.   
 The upcoming World Cup and Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, however, may provide the 
needed impetus for the Brazilian government to implement a holistic policy response to Rio’s 
crime problem. The New York Times notes that specially trained Police Pacification Units, 
which combine policing with social work have succeeded in reducing homicide rates and 
significantly increasing school attendance in some Rio neighborhoods.  Those accomplishments, 
according to The Washington Post, have begun to improve the Brazilian police force’s 
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“reputation for brutality and corruption in favelas.”109  Complementing its increased police 
presence and reformed pacification strategy, the Brazilian government is investing in the 
infrastructure of those neighborhoods, awarding $4.7 billion to 40 firms to redesign 582 them,110 
which it hopes will provide employment opportunities for residents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109
 Grudgings, Stuart.  January 23, 2011. “Brazil - and its businesses - look to bring new order to slums.” 
Washington Post.  Accessed October 20, 2011. 
34 Barrionuevo, Alex.  October 10, 2010.  “In Rough Slum, Brazil’s Police Try Soft Touch.” New York Times. 
Accessed October 20, 2011. 
110
 Grudgings, “Brazil - and its businesses - look to bring new order to slums.” 
 
  
 
Chapter III: The Origins of Brazilian Diplomatic Identity and Foreign Policy 
 
Nye holds that there are three sources of soft power for states: culture, political values 
and foreign policy. To be sure, Brazil possesses all three facets.  Though this thesis focuses 
primarily on the impact of domestic and foreign policy, it is worth briefly noting the attraction of 
Brazilian culture.  The most conspicuous example of that attraction of Brazilian culture is that 
country’s prowess in the world’s most popular sport—soccer.  Brazil has won five world cups, 
more than any other country and arguably the most talented player ever to play the game, Pelé 
(Edson Arantes do Nascimento), is Brazilian.  According to an ESPN article, “Pelé and Brazil 
helped shape the World Cup into the greatest show on earth.”111  Underscoring the power and 
reach of Brazilian soccer, in 1968 the belligerent parties to the Nigerian civil war agreed to a 
forty-eight hour cease-fire in order to watch Pelé play an exhibition game in Lagos.112  
Moreover, Brazil’s economic transition, stable political system and social policy serve as a 
model and source of inspiration for other developing countries.  Bolsa Familia, as noted in the 
previous chapter, has been replicated in Haiti and elsewhere.   
 Because Brazil is a geopolitically isolated middle power (it lacks the military and 
economic strength of a great power), diplomacy is a critical asset for projecting influence and 
obtaining foreign policy objectives.  Brazil’s ministry of foreign relations, Itamaraty, promotes 
multilateralism, adherence to international law and norms, international cooperation, and 
peaceful solutions to conflict.  Scholars have exalted Itamaraty’s talents in conflict mediation, 
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and have labeled it the “best foreign ministry in Latin America.”113 Moreover, Itamaraty has long 
been an elite institution and an instrument of Brazilian soft power.   This chapter traces the 
origins and evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy vision and diplomatic culture.114 
 Itamaraty, scholars note, possesses uncommon skills in conflict mediation.  To be sure, 
Itamaraty has demonstrated a capacity for negotiating peaceful resolutions to political conflict 
since around the turn of the twentieth century.  Between 1895 and 1909, it settled all of Brazil’s 
border disputes with neighbors and colonial powers through diplomatic negotiations and 
arbitration, and promoted cooperation between states in the Western Hemisphere (pan-
Americanism).115   
Brazil, as illustrated by its role in mediating bilateral conflicts between Peru and Ecuador, 
Colombia and Venezuela; combating internal threats to democracy in Paraguay, Venezuela, and 
Ecuador; and the use of military force (under UN auspices) to maintain international peace and 
security in Haiti remains a champion of diplomacy and international law as a conflict resolution 
mechanisms.   
 Burns116 and Lafer117 attribute Itamaraty’s ideological roots to the Rio Branco, Brazilian 
consul and foreign minister (1902-1912), who used his extensive knowledge of South American 
history and geography to peacefully and favorably118 resolve Brazil’s territorial disputes.  
Furthermore, he built the institution of Itamaraty, and “inspired the style of diplomatic behavior 
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that...characterizes Brazil,” which Lafer describes as “constructive moderation.”119  Moreover, 
there is a “line of continuity”120 121 in Brazilian diplomacy that can be drawn from the peaceful 
settlement of Brazil’s borders and pan-Americanism during the time of Rio Branco to modern 
Brazilian foreign policy initiatives such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967),122 123 the creation of 
Mercosur (1991)124, and command of MINUSTAH (2005).125  Moreover, the principles of 
foreign policy advocated by Rio Branco remain at the core of modern Brazilian diplomacy.  To 
understand the roots of Brazil’s diplomatic culture and Itamaraty as an institution requires a more 
detailed discussion of foreign policy under Rio Branco and the legacy he bequeathed to both the 
former and the latter.   
 During his tenure as Minister of Foreign Relations, Rio Branco had three principal 
foreign policy objectives: To settle Brazil’s border conflicts, establish its leadership in Latin 
America, and augment its international prestige. To be sure, Rio Branco’s most outstanding 
achievement, for which he became a national hero, was his successful negotiation of Brazil’s 
border disputes with France, Britain, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and 
Argentina, which yielded 342,000 square miles of additional territory for Brazil (an area of land 
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greater than France).126  Rubens Ricupero aptly captures the importance of that accomplishment, 
noting that, “it is difficult to find, in the history of international relations, a negotiating 
performance and an exclusively peaceful pattern similar to the Brazilian one in the establishment 
of national borders.”127   
 Two important facts further shed light on the critical significance of that accomplishment. 
Firstly, Brazil shares a nine thousand mile border with ten states.  And secondly, as Bradford 
observes, border disputes have been the cause of nearly all South American wars.128  For those 
reasons, Rio Branco sought to demarcate Brazil’s territorial dimensions.  Moreover, the 
settlement of those four century-old disputes, the last of which negotiations (with Uruguay and 
Peru) concluded in 1909,129 averted the further escalation of border wars (armed conflict had 
already broken out in the Amazon along the borders with Peru and Bolivia before mediation with 
those countries began).130 This enabled Brazil to establish a peaceful developmental trajectory 
from the early twentieth century onward without the nagging threat of armed conflict with 
neighboring states, a luxury which distinguishes it from Spanish American countries.131  Border 
conflicts persisted between Peru and Ecuador, Argentina and Chile, Venezuela and Guyana, 
Belize and Guatemala continued to struggle with border disputes into the 1990s and 2000s) 132, 
and emerging markets—Russia and China especially—still grapple with such quandaries.  
Furthermore, Brazil’s state-building process distinguishes itself from both BRIC countries and 
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many Spanish American states in that it “has been the result of successful diplomatic negotiation 
rather than engagement in military disputes.”133 
 Examining the methods and principles which Rio Branco applied during the resolution of 
Brazil’s border disputes, is instructive for tracing the origins of the diplomatic identity that 
characterizes Brazil today.  Rio Branco peacefully resolved territorial disputes through 
arbitration and diplomatic negotiations.  His first diplomatic victory came in 1895 (before his 
tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs) through arbitration.  U.S. President Grover Cleveland 
arbitrated Brazil and Argentina’s contested ownership of the Missions territory, during which 
Rio Branco’s argument, which he based on eighteenth-century documents, maps and Brazilian 
settlement of the area reigned triumphant.  President Cleveland, thus, awarded the 13,680 square 
mile territory to Brazil.   
 Although he would later become leery of arbitration after an unfavorable ruling in favor 
of Great Britain issued by Italian King Victor Emmanuel, that process was instrumental in 
delineating Brazil’s borders and was an essential aspect of Rio Branco’s diplomatic ambition to 
“distinguish his country as an outstanding world leader in peaceful solutions to international 
problems.”134  Although this effort was partially designed to deflect criticism of its rearmament 
program, by 1909, only Spain and the U.S. had signed more treaties of arbitration than Brazil.135 
 The loss in arbitration to Great Britain over British Guiana led Rio Branco to emphasize 
direct (bilateral) negotiations in later conflicts, a strategy which lent Brazil greater leverage in 
the processes. As a part of his strategy, Rio Branco chose to negate “vague” previous treaties 
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between Spain and Portugal which governed disputed South American territories.136  Instead, he 
utilized the doctrine of uti possidetis as the criterion for territorial ownership.  That principle 
(inherited from Portugal) stated that the requirement for territorial possession “would be whose 
citizens inhabited the disputed area.”137   
 Uti posseditis proved to be a powerful diplomatic tool in the dispute with Bolivia over 
Acre, where Brazilian rubber gatherers had come to constitute the majority of the population in 
that region.  Furthermore, Bolivia’s claims to the region were complicated by its effective lack of 
control over the region due to its distance from the Bolivian capital.  In essence, Brazilians 
formed the majority of the population and exercised de facto control over the economic activity 
in the territory.138  The Treaty of Petropolis reflected that reality, and gave Brazil possession of 
the 73,000 square mile area in 1903.139  In negotiations with Lima over Peruvian claims to Acre 
(North of the land claimed by Bolivia), Rio Branco successfully employed the same principles of 
negotiation.  Since Brazilians also made up the majority of the population in the Northern area of 
Acre, his argument proved most cogent.  Hence, Brazil took control of 63,000 square mile of that 
territory to Peru’s 10,000.140 
 In his endeavors to establish Brazil’s international prestige and regional leadership, Rio 
Branco shifted the focus of diplomatic relations from Europe to the Western Hemisphere.  He 
sent diplomats to both Quito and Bogota, capitals which had previously shared one 
representative and for the first time assigned representatives to several Central American 
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countries and Cuba, and sent his best diplomats to Washington, Lima, Santiago and Buenos 
Aires, thus prioritizing relations with those countries.141   
 Maintaining a friendly relationship with Washington was pivotal.  First of all, a close 
relationship with Washington was a matter of pragmatism for Brazil since the U.S. was the most 
lucrative market for its main export—coffee—and purchased an average of nearly 40% of its 
total annual exports from 1909-1911.142  Thus, Rio Branco and Ambassador Joaquin Nabuco 
sought successfully to maintain the favorable terms of trade that previous pro-American 
Ambassador to the U.S Salvador de Mendonça had obtained.143  In a bid to preserve access to the 
U.S. market, Nabuco honed friendly relationships with U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, 
President William H. Taft, and several influential senators, and managed to reduce Brazil’s 
tariffs on American goods, which had risen substantially since the 1891 agreement.  In addition, 
having congruent economic interests144 served as a foundation for strong political ties between 
the two countries. 
 Historical and political ties also facilitated Rio Branco’s efforts to maintain a close 
relationship with Washington.  The two countries shared a natural bond as young sizable 
republics and after its independence in 1889, Brazil looked to the U.S. Constitution as a model 
for its political organization and based its own constitution on that document. The U.S., “pleased 
to welcome another nation into the republican fraternity, especially one that openly took the 
Constitution of 1787 as its model” became the first international power to give that country 
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diplomatic recognition.  Furthermore, President Cleveland, as aforementioned, arbitrated the 
dispute with South American rival Argentina over the Mission, awarding that territory to Brazil. 
 Seeking to augment its prestige and regional leadership, under the stewardship of Rio 
Branco, Brazil used its support of the U.S.’s foreign policy toward Latin America to establish 
itself as an intermediary between the U.S. and the region. While many Latin American countries 
viewed the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Big Stick, and Dollar Diplomacy as a 
threat to sovereignty, Brazil viewed those policies as beneficial for its national defense 
(deterrence against European invasion) and for its position in regional disputes.  Diplomatic 
proximity to the U.S. assured that country’s moral support (or neutrality at the least) during in 
conflicts with neighbors,145 and increased “its diplomatic maneuverability in the South American 
chess game.”146  Furthermore, Rio Branco saw friendship with Washington as an opportunity to 
“offset [its] feeling of solitude or ostracism in South America.”147   
 In the view of the U.S., Rio Branco’s favorable interpretations of what Spanish America 
deemed to be an aggressive stance toward the region acted to boost support for its regional 
policies.  Furthermore, the presence of a friendly power in South America would make the 
formation of a regional alliance against it improbable.148  For Spanish America, Brazil’s 
representation in Washington (Brazil and the U.S. had mutually upgraded their foreign legations 
to embassies in 1905, signaling the strength of their relationship), 149 and apparent ability to 
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interpret American policies gave the impression that Brazil could lobby Washington on its 
behalf.    
    Brazil’s role as intermediary between Spanish America and the U.S. was particularly 
salient in maintaining smooth Chilean-American diplomatic relations.  During a 1908 boundary 
dispute between Chile and Peru, Ambassador Nabuco weighed in on Chile’s behalf and sought to 
secure Washington’s support of Chilean claims.150  That same year, Brazil lobbied Washington 
on Paraguay’s behalf, to establish a legation in that country.   
 Rio Branco strove to maintain cooperative relations with Brazil’s neighbors through 
support of pan-Americanism, albeit as a part of a strategic effort to raise Brazil’s international 
prestige.151  Despite publicly promoting the pan-American ideal of “friendship among the 
American peoples,” in reality, the foreign minister privately distrusted Brazil’s neighbors and 
once declared that “no Spanish-speaking country is good and no person of Spanish blood can be 
trusted.”152 Hence, it should be noted that a staunch realism guided Rio Branco’s official 
promotion of cooperation with Latin America.153  However, acrimonious relations and conflict 
with those states would have impeded his ultimate objectives of advancing Brazil’s regional and 
international prestige. In short, by establishing itself as an essential diplomatic link between the 
U.S. and Latin America, Brazil enhanced its prestige and leadership in the region—two of Rio 
Branco’s primary foreign policy objectives.  
 Despite his leeriness of Spanish America, Rio Branco, according to Burns, promoted 
regional cooperation, or Pan-Americanism, in three ways.  First, his resolution of Brazil’s 
territorial boundaries removed the primary cause of armed conflict in Latin America—border 
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disputes—and established a platform for cooperation with neighboring states.154  Second, he 
expanded Itamaraty’s participation in international affairs, which gave impetus to regional 
cooperation. Brazil also attended regional and global conferences such as the Montevideo 
Sanitary Congress (1904), the Geneva Conference on the Red Cross (1906), and the Fourth 
International Congress of Fisheries (1908), and the Second International Peace Conference at 
The Hague to name a few.155 And third, Rio Branco used Brazil’s position as a regional 
intermediary to ameliorate relations between the U.S. and Spanish America, as evidenced by his 
efforts at the third Third Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro where the “U.S. was 
accepted more by the continent and old suspicions and resentments were mitigated.”156 
 Rio Branco was also instrumental in the early institutional modernization of Itamaraty.  
As Minister of Foreign Relations, he oversaw the expansion of Brazil’s diplomatic workforce, 
which he sought to fill with young attractive (tall and European looking) intellectuals, including 
recognized authors and cultural icons of the time.  He also enhanced diplomats’ pay and 
beautified the Itamaraty building establishing an extensive library and map archive.  According 
to Burns, Rio Branco transformed Itamaraty from a “cramped and disorganized” institution into 
an “up-to-date, efficient, and tightly run ministry,” and “made it capable of fully implementing” 
his foreign policies.157   
 Rio Branco’s impact on Brazilian diplomacy was long lasting.  The enhancement of 
prestige, pursued through close relations with the U.S. and participation in international forums, 
remained a core element of Brazilian foreign policy until after World War II.  To strengthen their 
relationship with Washington and buttress its international prestige, Brazil distinguished itself as 
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the only South American country to declare war on the Axis powers and contribute to the Allies’ 
World War I effort.158  Brazil seemingly accomplished its objective: three of the Big Five 
countries—Great Britain, France, and Italy—upgraded their delegations in Rio de Janeiro to 
embassies.159  Furthermore, Brazil, having declared war on the Axis powers, had ostensibly 
gained a role in European affairs, which led Itamaraty to conceive of an important dual role for 
Brazil in promoting cooperation in Europe and Latin America.160  With key support from 
Washington, Brazil participated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, out of which came the 
Treaty of Versailles, which delineated the terms of peace after the war, and the League of 
Nations.161  That same year, Brazil became the only Latin American state to obtain a seat on the 
first Council of the League of Nations, to which it would be re-elected in 1922.162  Thus, as 
Stanley observes, “The 1920s offered...what seemed to be a unique opportunity for bolstering 
Brazil’s international status through the political endorsement of the great powers.”163   
 Seeking to consolidate Brazil’s prestigious role in international politics, during the mid-
1920s, the President Bernardes’ administration “exerted itself ‘to the utmost’ to secure 
permanent membership” on the League’s Council.164  Parallel to its efforts to position itself as a 
diplomatic intermediary between the U.S. and Latin America under Rio Branco, Brazil sought to 
establish a niche role for itself at the League of Nations as a spokesperson for smaller countries’ 
interests, while expecting to be treated as an equal to the great powers.   
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 Great powers scoffed at those efforts; For example, British Ambassador to Brazil, John 
Tilley, characterized Brazil’s interest in permanent membership as “showy” in a report to the 
Foreign Office, and predicted that if not granted a permanent seat, it would lose interest in the 
organization as a whole.165  As Stanley notes, Tilley’s suspicion proved correct, as in 1926 Brazil 
pulled out of the organization after European powers neglected to grant it permanent 
membership after admitting Germany.166 Europe’s rejection of Brazil as a key player in the 
maintenance of international peace and security and was a “major diplomatic defeat...that 
revealed how chimerical the pursuit of elevated international status was without sufficient 
national power”167 and pushed Brazil back towards one of the keystones of Rio Branco’s 
diplomacy: prioritization of relations with the Western Hemisphere.  Hence, Brazil, despite its 
international activism failed to obtain the political endorsement from great powers that it sought. 
 The same foreign policy objectives which propelled Brazil to partake in World War I and 
the League of Nations also motivated Brazil to participate in the Allied effort during World War 
II.  Hilton describes Vargas’ decision to send the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (over 20,000 
Brazilian troops) to alongside the American 5th Army in Northern Italy168 “as a calculated move 
to enhance Brazil’s prestige and bargaining position in postwar councils.”169  Brazil’s wartime 
partnership with the U.S. was not just a “showy” affair, but also a strategic calculation which 
yielded much needed military and industrial development assistance.  Brazilianist Thomas E. 
Skidmore affirms that in 1942, with the Brazilian Air Force only three years old, the U.S. took 
over “training of Brazilian pilots and began furnishing hundreds of planes under the lend lease 
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act” and furthermore that there “followed a flood of other military equipment from the U.S.” as 
well as “financing for a national steel plant which was later constructed at Volta Redonda.”170 
 At the end of the Second World War, Brazil felt deserving of special treatment from 
Washington for its contribution to the Allied war effort; the U.S.’s attention, however, was 
concentrated Cold War security and the rebuilding of Western Europe, and Washington issued 
only indefinite promises of a Latin American Marshall Plan, which amounted to minimal actual 
economic aid.  Santos notes that between 1945 and 1952, Belgium and Luxemburg together 
received more economic assistance from the U.S. than all twenty Latin American states 
combined.171  Lack of economic assistance, along with Roosevelt’s unfulfilled promise to Brazil 
that it would obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, produced a sense of 
disillusionment in the Brazilian foreign policy community. In turn, what Brazil perceived as the 
betrayal of its most important ally, engendered a major shift in the focus of that country’s 
diplomacy away from the prioritization of prestige and cultivation of close ties with Washington.   
 Instead, from the 1960s to the early 1980s, Brazil aligned itself politically with Third 
World coalitions and adopted economic development as its core objective; hence, Brazil was 
proactive within the G-77 and the trade related organizations of the post-war era, particularly the 
GATT and UNCTAD.172  Within those organizations, it strongly defended non-discrimination 
measures, such as a Most Favored Nation status as well as policies which favored developing 
countries.  Brazil also favored non-reciprocity (and the right to take retaliatory action in the form 
of anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties) in trade negotiations to counteract against 
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“arbitrary measures and unilateral...protectionist action of the industrialized countries.”173  
 However, while voicing strong support of the aforementioned principles, Brazil did not 
play a leading role in lobbying for developing countries’ interests during trade negotiations.174  
Furthermore, from 1968 to 1988, Brazil remained absent as a non-permanent member on the UN 
Security Council.  That lack of participation was uncharacteristic of Brazil, as that country has 
served as a non-permanent member of the Council ten times (twenty non-consecutive years) 
since the creation of the UN, which is more than any other non-permanent member.175  Brazil’s 
leadership role in international institutions would resume after its economic stabilization under 
the Cardoso and Lula administrations.   
 As evidenced by the Cardoso and Lula administrations’ emphasis on multilateral 
diplomacy as a means of addressing peace and security, trade, and the post-2008 global 
economic recovery, soft power remains a core element of Brazilian foreign today.  As this 
chapter shows, Brazilian diplomatic culture’s embrace of multilateralism and championship of 
international law and diplomacy as tools of peaceful conflict resolution are legacies of Rio 
Branco.   
Chapter IV: Brazil’s Regional Leadership 
 As the previous chapter illustrates, the concept of Brazil as a regional leader is not a 
novelty in Brazilian foreign policy.  Rio Branco, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations from 
1902-1912, sought to raise Brazil’s prestige and regional leadership.  He attempted to achieve 
that objective by augmenting Brazil’s participation in regional and international organizations, 
establishing Brazil as a leader in peaceful solutions to international conflict, promoting 
hemispheric cooperation and by honing an informal alliance with the United States that 
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buttressed its relative power and allowed it to become an intermediary between Washington and 
Latin America.   
 This chapter will examine three facets of Brazil’s role as a regional leader: crisis 
management, economic integration, and political cooperation.  To elucidate those aspects of 
Brazilian regional leadership, case studies will be provided.  In assessing Brazil’s role as regional 
crisis manager, I will discuss its mediation of the Ecuador-Peru border conflict, persuading Cuba 
to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco, combating the return of authoritarian rule in Paraguay and 
Honduras, and its command of MINUSTAH.  Moreover, to elucidate its economic leadership I 
will examine Brazil’s role in Mercosur, while Unasur and the Rio Group will serve as case 
studies for Brazilian political leadership.  Lastly, I will assess the successes and limitations of 
Brazil’s regional leadership. 
 
 
 
 
Crisis Management 
Brazil has long played a role as a diplomatic interlocutor and defender of regional democratic 
norms.176  As the previous chapter reveals, Brazil established itself as an intermediary between 
the U.S. and Latin America around the turn of the century during Rio Branco’s tenure as foreign 
minister.  Beyond the role of intermediary, Brazil also has a chronicled history of involvement in 
regional peacekeeping, which dates to the time of the League of Nations when that country sent a 
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naval officer to join a committee which administered a dispute between Colombia and Ecuador 
over the Leticia territory.177  
 
Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute 
 As a part of a group of “friendly powers” (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the U.S.) Brazil 
was instrumental in resolving a border dispute between Ecuador and Peru which dates back to 
the early 19th century.  Both disputants signed the 1942 Rio Protocol, as did the four powers as a 
formal means of signaling their commitment to resolving disagreements over border demarcation 
and the enactment of a treaty provision which called for mutual land concessions.  The Brazilian 
government appointed Naval Captain Braz Días de Aguiar as a technical expert to assist an 
Ecuadorian-Peruvian mixed boundary commission to delineate the border between the two 
countries; according to St. John, the commission heeded De Aguiar’s decisions regarding the 
disputant’s geographic boundaries with only minor exceptions.178   
 The resolution of the conflict in 1945 was short-lived, however, as a U.S. Air Force aerial 
study of the Cordillera del Condor, the region in question, revealed the inaccuracy of previous 
geographic depictions.  That study reignited the conflict.  The Ecuadorian government claimed 
that the terms of the Rio Protocol, which were based on flawed information, unfairly favored 
Peru and impeded it from obtaining fluvial access to the Amazon (via the Marañon River).  Peru, 
in contrast, continued to support the terms of the Rio Protocol.  Despite the friendly powers’ 
attempts to resolve the conflict, most prominently by the U.S. under the Carter Administration 
and afterward under Secretary of State Alexander Haig, both sides remained intransigent and 
                                                 
177
 Herz, Monica.  2011.  “Policy Brief: Os Brics e as Operações de Paz.” BRICS Policy Center 1-9, 4. 
http://bricspolicycenter.org/homolog/uploads/trabalhos/484/doc/1272387016.pdf 
178
 St. John, Ronald Bruce.  1996. “Conflict in the Cordillera del Condor: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute.”  The IBRU 
Boundary and Security Bulletin 78-85. 
periodic minor skirmishes persisted until tensions led to a month long military clash (the Cenepa 
War) in January 1995.179 
 Brazil was central to negotiating the end of the Cenepa War, which claimed the lives of 
more than one thousand people.180 In February 1995, Ecuador and Peru signed The Declaración 
de Itamaraty in Brazil, which included a cease-fire, provisions for military demobilization, and a 
framework for bilateral talks.181  Later, in 1998, Brazil again hosted Ecuador and Peru in 
Brasilia, where the two countries signed the Acta de Brasilia, which marked the conclusion of 
the five-decade old conflict and addressed the remaining differences between the two 
countries.182  During the commemorative ceremony, President Cardoso spoke on behalf of the 
four guarantors of the Rio Protocol, and commended the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Presidents 
(Alberto Fujimori and Jamil Mahuad) for their perseverance in guiding their countries to 
peace.183  
 
Cuba 
 The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which makes Latin America a nuclear weapon free zone, while 
initiated in 1967, did not enter force until 1994, requiring the signatures of every state in the 
region to take effect.  In that year, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim made a three day 
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trip to Cuba,184 which at that time was the only Latin American country which had not yet signed 
the treaty.  During that visit, Amorim convinced Fidel Castro “to join [the Treaty of Tlatelolco] 
on the grounds that it benefitted Latin America, irrespective of the United States’ interests.”185  
Moreover, as Krasno notes, this was “a major achievement for non-proliferation and Latin 
America.”186 
 
 
Paraguayan Democracy 
 The Cardoso Administration’s role in preventing a 1996 military coup in Paraguay 
highlights the key role that Brazil plays in safeguarding democratic governance in the region.  
Democracy had only recently been restored in that country after thirty-five years of authoritarian 
rule under Alfredo Stroessner, with the first civilian president, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, elected by 
popular vote in free and competitive elections in 1993.187  According to Valenzuela, despite 
democratically held elections, the armed forces still wielded considerable control over 
governmental decision making, and posed a formidable challenge to democratic consolidation in 
Paraguay.188 Hence, when Wasmosy insisted on dismissing army commander General Lino 
Cesar Oviedo from his post, a confrontation that threatened to upset Paraguayan constitutional 
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order ensued.  With the support of other Paraguayan generals, Oviedo189 responded with threats 
to spill  “rivers of blood.”190   
 The Cardoso Administration, alongside the U.S. and the EU, stood firmly in support of 
the Wasmosy administration and made clear that a coup would result in Paraguay’s isolation and 
economic sanctions.  Brazilian Ambassador Marcio D'Oliveira Dias issued a strong initial public 
statement on behalf of Mercosur condemning Oviedo’s actions.  Later during the crisis, after 
Wasmosy had sought to compromise by allowing Oviedo to assume command of the Ministry of 
Defense, Ambassador Dias attempted (unsuccessfully) to convince Oviedo not to accept the 
offer, given the overwhelming opposition of the Paraguayan people.191  
 Leveraging Paraguay’s membership in Mercosur and growing economic dependence on 
Brazil (in 1995 Paraguay’s exports to Brazil accounted for half of its GDP), the Cardoso 
Administration threatened to cut trade ties, suspend payments for electricity generated by 
Paraguay’s portion of the Itaipu Dam (which represented 26% of the Paraguayan government 
budget)192 and eliminate other crucial subsidies.193  Moreover, according to Genna and Hiroi, 
Brazil’s staunch support of Paraguayan democratic leadership proved prominent in leading the 
general and his followers to recognize “the futility of their actions.”194 195 
                                                 
189
 Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko Hiroi.  2004. “Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul.” Latin 
American Perspectives 34: 43-57.  General Oviedo barricaded himself at the First Army Corps headquarters, and 
declared that he would only relinquish his command of the army if he was made defense minister 
190
 Valenzuela, “The Coup That Didn’t Happen,” 46-47.  Stroessner ruled from 1954 to 1989 after being deposed in 
a coup by the armed forces. 
191
 Ibid 
192
 Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko, “Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul,” 47.  Sanctions 
against Paraguay were economically risky for Brazil too, as severing trade with Paraguay and effectively shutting 
down the Itaipu generator would have led to a 25 percent reduction in Brazil’s electricity. 
193
 Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko, “Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul,” 47 
194
 Ibid, 47.  General Oviedo subsequently turned himself in on April 24, 1996. 
195
 Valenzuela,  “The Coup That Didn’t Happen,” 51.  Valenzuela attributes the prevention of the coup less to 
Paraguay’s economic dependency and more to “loyalist sectors of the armed forces” which came to see civilian rule 
as the best way to assure the preservation of the armed forces. 
 In contrast to its prominent role in defending Paraguayan democracy, Brazil has been less 
proactive on other instances of democratic erosion in Peru under Alberto Fujimori, and in 
Venezuela under Hugo Chavez.  As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, Brazil “does 
not...engage in what U.S. policymakers would recognize as democracy or human rights 
promotion.”196  Regardless, Brazil has reduced the saliency of Chavez’s vision through its 
diplomacy and the precedent it has set for the region through its own process of  
democratization, economic reform, and successful redistributive social policies.197 
 
Peacekeeping in Haiti 
 Brazil has commanded the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 
the only peacekeeping mission in the Americas, since 2004.198  There are roughly 2,200 
Brazilian personnel in MINUSTAH.199  The stabilization mission, established by Security 
Council Resolution 1542,200 involves a wide variety of tasks, including “the monitoring, 
restructuring and reforms of the Haitian national police; assisting the transitional government 
with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for armed groups; assisting 
with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; 
protecting United Nations personnel and installations and local civilians.201  Brazil’s presence in 
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Haiti, before the devastating 2010 earthquake, according to one UN General Assembly official, 
assisted in bringing greater stability to the capital city, Port-au-Prince.   
 The 2010 earthquake and the subsequent outbreak of Cholera202 on the island have added 
to the complexity and responsibilities of that mission, to which Brazil responded with increased 
financial and personnel support, thus “reaffirming its commitment to Haiti’s development and 
UN peacekeeping.”203  Brazil sought to lead the humanitarian recovery efforts, putting together a 
$205 million relief package, which the Foreign Minister dubbed the “Lula Plan.”  Brazil also 
sent a rescue contingent of 1,300 workers, ten units of doctors, 6,000 tons of food, and eleven 
tons of water.204 
 Scholars and journalists unanimously explain Brazil’s efforts in Haiti as an integral part 
of its bid to prove itself worthy of a seat on the Security Council, if and when that body expands 
its permanent membership.  Military command of a major UN peacekeeping mission--currently 
the only one in the Western Hemisphere—is a great source of prestige.  It also enhances Brazil’s 
international image as a promulgator of international security norms and showcases its 
commitment to the UN’s founding purpose of maintaining international peace and security.  The 
strategic aspects of Brazil’s role in Haiti will be discussed more in depth in the subsequent 
chapter on Brazil’s international leadership. 
 Despite its contributions to security and the humanitarian relief effort in Haiti growing 
public outrage at UN peacekeepers over the Cholera epidemic, as well as recent allegations that 
Uruguayan troops sexually assaulted an eighteen-year-old man, seem to have motivated Brazil to 
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hasten its exit from Haiti, as Defense Minister Celso Amorim announced that Brazil will begin a 
partial withdrawal of its troops next March.205 
 
Economic Integration 
 Brazil played a pivotal role in the creation of Mercosur, a free trade organization and 
customs union with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.  Mercosur’s underpinning is Brazil’s 
rapprochement with its long time rival--Argentina.  The military regimes which ruled those 
countries (in Brazil from 1964-1985 and in Argentina from 1976-1983) viewed one another  as 
national security threats.  As a result of the rivalry and mutual distrust that characterized the 
countries’ bilateral relationship, both had developed secret nuclear programs.206  However, under 
the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and 
in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the two countries agreed 
to “mutual inspections to ensure that neither country [was] pursuing nuclear weapons and that 
nuclear research facilities [were] not diverting nuclear material for weapons use.”207  
 Those measures assisted in bringing about a thaw in relations between the two countries, 
and in 1986 civilian presidents José Sarney of Brazil and Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina met at the 
Iguaçu River, (which separates the two countries), signifying a formal normalization.  Later that 
year, Sarney and Alfonsín signed a twelve point protocol to create a common market.208  
Mercosur later incorporated Paraguay and Uruguay as formal bloc members in 1990,209 and more 
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recently signed a deal with the Community of Andean nations, thus making Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Chile, and Bolivia associate members. 
 Mercosur holds great economic and political consequence for Brazil.  As the most 
competitive economy within the world’s fourth largest trading bloc, Brazil stood to benefit from 
expanding regional markets for its exports and investment opportunities for its enterprises and to 
increase its leverage in international trade negotiations by creating an economy of scale.      
 The organization has succeeded in deepening Brazil’s trade and investment ties with 
members.  As a result, Brazil’s future economic development, according to the Council on 
Foreign Relations, is tied to further integration of regional infrastructure.210  Since 2004, Brazil’s 
total trade with Mercosur countries more than doubled, from $15.3 to $36.6 billion.211  Worth 
noting, also, is the fact that Brazil’s annual trade with the Latin America and the Caribbean (the 
majority of which is with Mercosur countries) exceeds trade volumes with Brazil’s two largest 
trading partners, China and the U.S., respectively.212 Significantly, Brazil’s trade with Argentina, 
which suffered after the Brazilian currency devaluation (1999) and Argentine financial crisis 
(1999-2001), has reached record levels. Total trade between the two countries rose from $30.86 
billion in 2008 to $32.95 billion in 2010.213   
 Despite record volumes, however, the two states’ trade relationship remains conflictive, 
as does intra-bloc trade in general. Much of the enduring tension has to do with Brazil’s 
economic preponderance, the persistence of its protectionist practices, and its unwillingness to 
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make trade and investment concessions.214 Furthermore, tariff disputes continue, and are 
aggravated due to Mercosur’s lack of institutionalization: That organization has failed to 
implement a genuine customs union and common external tariff, and lacks a viable dispute 
resolution mechanism.215  
 Thus, Mercosur lacks the ability to internally resolve trade conflicts between Argentina 
and Brazil, which have been commonplace over the past few years.  The most recent of those 
tiffs, over Brazil’s refusal to grant import licenses for Argentine auto imports (a critical 
Argentine export, 80% of which go to Brazil) could significantly harm the Argentine economy, 
which is already experiencing double digit inflation.216  Despite the frequency of Brazilian-
Argentine trade conflicts, however, this one in particular marks a divergence in foreign policy 
between the Rousseff and Lula Administrations.  While Lula, in the name of advancing regional 
cooperation, sought to curtail such disputes, the new Rousseff administration seems to be 
forgoing such “strategic patience.”217  
 Ideological opposition from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, which view free trade as 
exploitative, also poses as a barrier to regional economic integration.  In an effort to co-opt 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s attempts to expand its socialist-statist ideological influence 
through “largesse stemming from his country’s windfall oil profits,”218 the Lula Administration 
sought that country’s accession as a full member of Mercosur.  According to The Economist, 
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Venezuela’s accession, which is still pending Brazilian congressional approval, could undermine 
not only that organization’s commitment to free trade, but also to democratic governance, and is 
a step in the wrong directions.219 
 South America seems to be moving away from regional integration toward the formation 
of two distinct trading blocs.220  Countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Chile despite their status 
as associate members of Mercosur, favor trading arrangements with the U.S. and Asia.  Recently, 
those three countries signed a free trade agreement with Mexico, designed to create an integrated 
market that can compete with Brazil and further ties to Asian markets.221  Thus, the 
fragmentation of free trade agreements in South America poses as a barrier to Brazilian 
leadership of an economically integrated region. 
 Brazil has furthered its role as a regional creditor and investor: In 2010, the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) disbursed $100 billion in credit projects throughout Latin 
America, twenty-three percent higher than in 2009 and exceeding investment totals by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank (WB).  Brazil is also a much needed 
source of foreign direct investment in the region. Brazilian conglomerates, with financing from 
the BNDES, an institution which former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
describes as a lever for the expansion of Brazilian business, have invested in infrastructure 
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projects in Guyana, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru, and elsewhere.222 Moreover, according to Simon 
Romero of the New York Times, BNDES annual lending now trumps that of the World Bank, 
and “has become a principal means for Brazil to project its power across Latin America.”223  And 
despite Brazil’s consensual form of leadership—exemplified by its acquiescence to Bolivia’s 
nationalization Petrobras property and agreement to triple payments to Paraguay for use of that 
country’s share of Itaipu dam-produced energy—as well as its meticulous efforts to downplay its 
growing regional presence, its expanding investment footprint in the region has engendered a 
nationalistic backlash in neighboring countries which remain weary of Brazil’s intentions.   
 Much of that sentiment has been a reaction to the BNDES’ expansionary lending 
policies224 aimed at expanding Brazilian firms’ presence in the region, and in no country has  
opposition been as fierce as in Bolivia, where violent protests recently forced President Evo 
Morales to suspend the construction of a BNDES funded highway.  The project was to be 
completed by a Brazilian firm, OAS.  In connecting Cochabamba to Beni the highway would 
traverse a natural reserve and pass through indigenous territory.  Those who oppose the project, 
including the indigenous population and Bolivian intellectuals, claim that the project would 
solely benefit Brazil.  They argue that Brazil would obtain a Pacific export outlet, while Bolivia 
would get stuck with the deleterious environmental effects of the project.  Protestors have 
labeled Brazil’s intentions as imperialistic, “likening [Brazilians] to the slave hunters who 
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expanded the boundaries of colonial Brazil;” those sort of accusations, Romero notes, are usually 
reserved for the U.S. 225   
 The governments of Guyana, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina have also suspended BNDES 
financed projects.  Those countries’ governments’ concerns stem from a perceived lack of 
economic benefit, citing labor distributions which favor jobs for Brazilians for example, and also 
apprehensive over possible negative environmental impact and the displacement of indigenous 
people.226   Hence, economic asymmetries, an enduring fear of hegemonic exploitation, and 
political instability in South America present significant challenges to Brazil’s efforts to lead 
economic integration efforts in that region. 
 That is not to say that Brazil has made no concessions to its neighbors in the process of 
economic integration.  For Mercosur’s smallest economies--Uruguay and Paraguay--membership 
has brought benefits some benefits.  Both states have increased their leverage in international 
trade negotiations and taken advantage of development assistance from Mercosur’s Fund for 
Structural Convergence (FOCEM), an institution designed to reduce structural asymmetries 
between the bloc’s weaker and stronger economies and counteract against the effects of tariff 
reductions.  That fund has favored Uruguay and Paraguay, which have received $191 and $822 
million in soft loans compared to Argentina and Brazil’s $27 and $45 million allotments.227 
Paraguay, in particular, has availed itself of FOCEM funding to build a 500 kilowatt electrical 
grid, which will connect Asuncion to Itaipu Dam on the Brazilian border, and 300 kilometers of 
electricity lines to support its industry, housing, and water supply.228   
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 Nevertheless, Paraguay and Uruguay’s trade relationship with Brazil and Argentina 
remains contentious.  Uruguay, frustrated by an unresolved dispute with Argentina over a paper 
pulp mill on their shared border, signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the 
U.S.;  if that agreement leads to a formal free trade agreement, it would violate Mercosur’s 
charter, which prohibits members from signing bilateral agreements with non-members.229  
Moreover, the bloc would either have to expel Uruguay or rewrite its charter to allow for such 
trade agreements to occur.  In any case, the case illustrates both the disillusionment and lack of 
respect for Mercosur as an institution. 
 
Political Leadership: The Rio Group and the Community of South American Nations  
 Brazil is the architect of the Rio Group, a coalition of Latin American states which 
emerged in 1986 as the successor to the Contadora Group,230 a diplomatic union which sought a 
regional resolution to the Cold War related conflicts in Central America during the 1980s.  Brazil 
formed part of the Contadora Support Group, which also included Argentina, Peru, and 
Uruguay.231   
 The Rio Group, composed of twenty-three Latin American states, is an informal 
diplomatic group and lacks a permanent institutional structure.  Members’ heads of state meet 
annually to discuss regional and international issues of common interest and seek to form 
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common foreign policy positions.232  The group also sought to enhance cooperation on 
economic, social, scientific and technological development issues.233 
 Burges highlights the Rio Group’s utility for Brazil as a tool for regional leadership in his 
analysis of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, a U.S. proposal to make 
the Western Hemisphere a free trade zone.  At the Miami Summit, Itamaraty used its temporary 
presidency of that group as a mechanism to coordinate a common economic position in 
negotiations. The U.S. sought to use access to its lucrative domestic market as a lever to 
liberalize Latin American economies.  Yet, Brazil and other South American economies were 
still hurting from liberal economic adjustments.  
 Itamaraty capitalized on this shared experience; it drafted alternative treaty text and 
guided a consensus position among Rio Group members opposing U.S. trade positions, such as 
longer adjustment periods for implementation of tariff reductions and the decoupling of 
environmental, labor, and good governance from a final trade agreement.  Furthermore, Brazil 
thought Rio Group cooperation could serve to extract a more favorable agreement for itself 
South American countries.  The end result, in short, was the failure of a hemispheric free trade 
union due to diverging Rio Group-U.S. positions; instead, negotiations splintered and produced  
an assortment of bilateral trade agreements.  Regardless, Brazil’s ability to generate ideas, frame 
the terms of trade talks, and employ its central position in the Rio Group to unite South 
American countries in support of its objectives showcases its consensual form of leadership.234  
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Moreover, Brazil eschewed overt leadership, for historical reasons235 and because it lacked the 
financial resources to conduct carrot-and-stick diplomacy and offer incentives for cooperation.  
As Burges notes, Brazil’s style of leadership “provides some solidity to notions of soft 
power.”236 
 In 2000, under President Cardoso’s leadership, Brazil initiated a dialogue on far-reaching 
regional integration in South America at the Brasilia Summit (also known as the First South 
American Presidential Summit) in the Brazilian capital.  The summit produced five regional 
priorities:  the integration of Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN); regional transport 
and infrastructure integration, cooperation on the development of science and technology, 
reduction of corruption and money laundering, and the consolidation of democracy, human rights 
and freedom.237 
 South American presidents reconvened at summits held in Guayaquil in 2002 and Cuzco 
in 2004.  The 2004 summit produced the Cuzco Declaration, which vowed to improve regional 
diplomatic and political coordination as a means of expanding South America as a “pole of 
economic and political power in order to influence world politics.”238  The Cuzco Declaration 
also vowed to create a “United States of South America” modeled on the European Union, and 
called for the creation of a common currency, a tariff-free common market, and a regional 
parliament.239 At Cuzco, President Lula was instrumental in the creation of the South American 
Community of Nations (SACN), and that group’s successor, the Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) which replaced the SACN at the former group’s third presidential summit in 
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Brazil in 2008.240  Furthermore, as Roett observes, Brazil is UNASUR’s acknowledged leader, 
and while the prospects for success of the deep regional integration measures envisioned by that 
group remain uncertain, Brazil’s central role in that institution building process is a conspicuous 
illustration of that country’s newfound self-confidence.241 
  
Conclusions 
 Undoubtedly, Brazil is a de facto leader in Latin America: It possesses the largest 
territory, population, and economy, and has become a crucial source of investment and growth in 
the region.  Furthermore, it has taken responsibility for promoting political stability and peaceful 
conflict resolution through both diplomatic and military means.  Although Brazil has succeeded 
in deepening regional trade and investment ties, and serving as a force for stability, it has failed 
for a variety of reasons to garner neighboring countries’ support for its leadership both in the 
region and in international affairs.  
 Brazil hoped that economic integration would improve cooperation with its neighbors 
and help to consolidate regional support for its burgeoning international activism.  Yet as the 
persistence of Mercosur trade conflicts and resistance to BNDES financed projects illustrates, 
South America is far from uniting as an economic and political bloc, and much less so as one 
that  would lend its support to Brazil as its representative.   As Hurrell observes, some Latin 
American states are unconvinced that Brazil has their interests in mind and refuse to support 
Brazil as a spokesperson for the region in international affairs.242  While Brazil has obtained a 
significant amount of support for its aspiration toward permanent membership on the UN 
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Security Council, Argentina and Colombia especially remain opposed.243  Moreover, Brazil has 
encountered difficulty in generating support for its candidates Brazilian candidates in other 
international organizations.  As Soares de Lima and Hirst highlight, during elections for the 
director-general of the WTO, Brazil failed to unite regional support for its candidate.244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V: Brazil’s International Leadership 
 
   Domestic economic and political stability have permitted Brazil to renew its long time 
foreign policy goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.   To craft support 
for that objective, Brazil has sought to bolster its qualifications through its command of 
MINUSTAH, and through cultivating diplomatic partnerships with both emerging market and 
industrial countries.  As the world’s eighth largest economy, Brazil has leveraged its increased 
economic standing to lead emerging market countries’ push to obtain greater influence within the 
Bretton Woods organizations. Moreover, using its own social policies as a model, Brazil has 
bolstered its soft power through foreign aid to developing countries. 
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 The Unforgotten Quest for Permanent Security Council Membership 
 As discussed in Chapter Three, Brazil has long taken an active role in international 
collective security organizations.  It was an original non-permanent member of the League of 
Nations and the United Nations, reflecting its military alliance with the Allies in World Wars I 
and II and its diplomacy promoting cooperative relations in Europe and Latin America.  In 
addition, Brazil has been elected as non-permanent member to the Security Council ten times 
since the creation of the UN—a more than any other country.245   
 Vigorous Itamaraty attempts to secure support for Brazil’s permanent seat on the League 
of Nations and UN Security Council, however, failed.  This was largely a consequence of its lack 
of economic and military capabilities and inability to secure the unanimous political endorsement 
of great powers.  Having consolidated economic and political stability after the 1994 Real Plan, 
Brazilian foreign policy carries a newfound self-esteem.  Its confidence restored, Brazil has 
strengthened its international leadership, and renewed its elusive quest for a permanent seat on 
the Security Council.   
 Brazil frames its ambition on notions of representational fairness and the need to reflect 
the rising power of developing countries as well as the absence of geographical permanent 
representation for South America on the Security Council.  In a written commentary to the UN 
General Assembly regarding its position on Security Council reform, the Brazilian Mission 
stated: “We want our region to be present in the Security Council on a permanent basis and, 
through ample coordination and consultation, to have an even stronger collective voice.”246 
Presidents Cardoso and Lula invested ample political capital in building regional economic and 
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political ties through the promotion of Mercosur and Unasur in order to solidify the concept of 
South America as a political and economic unit with Brazil as its leader and regional 
representative.  That endeavor failed, nonetheless, as Brazil has been unable to consolidate 
support among its historically distrustful Spanish-speaking South American neighbors, which 
doubt that Brazil has their interests in mind.  Notably, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela have 
expressed opposition to Brazil’s potential accession as a permanent Security Council member.  
 Notwithstanding regional opposition, Brazil now counts on a broad alliance of support 
from major powers, emerging markets, and developing countries for its permanent accession to 
the Security Council.  Among major powers, Brazil has backing from the UK, France, and 
Russia. The U.S. has voiced support of Brazil’s contribution to security and development in 
Haiti, though it has not given an outright endorsement for its permanent membership.  Members 
of the G4 (Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India), IBSA Forum (Brazil, India, and South Africa), 
and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Brazil, Portugal, São Tomé, 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Angola) also support Brazil’s candidacy. 
 To bolster its credentials for permanent membership, Brazil maintains an active role in 
UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil has historically been a moderate contributor to UN 
peacekeeping missions since its participation in the League of Nations (during which time it 
mediated a territorial dispute between Peru and Colombia) and since the creation of the UN, it 
has supplied seventeen million personnel.247  In 2011, Brazil was the second largest contributor 
of the BRICs to UN peacekeeping personnel (behind India) and the thirteenth overall, with 2,260 
troops.248  However, that number is still relatively low compared to the number of personnel 
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contributed by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh for example.249  While the centerpiece of that 
effort is its command of MINUSTAH, Brazil also contributes personnel to missions in East 
Timor, Lebanon, Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sudan, and Western Sahara.250    
 What is unprecedented about Brazil’s peacekeeping role is the type of its participation.  It 
leads MINUSTAH, which is a Chapter Seven peacekeeping mission.  Chapter Seven Security 
Council resolutions allow forcible international intervention into a state to restore international 
peace and security if other measures, such as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, are 
deemed inadequate.  It is noteworthy that in heading that mission, Brazil departed from its 
former policy of non-intervention.251  
 Leadership of MINUSTAH is a strategic component of Brazilian foreign policy designed 
to showcase its capacity to mitigate threats to international peace and security.  There is no 
immediate national interest in Haiti’s stability for Brazil as there is for the U.S—after all, those 
seeking to escape that country’s misery do not end up on Brazil’s shores.  Rather, as Herz notes, 
“Brazil’s elite thinks peacekeeping is part of the price you have to pay to be among the nations 
who make the rules.”252 
 
Soft Power through Foreign Aid 
 Despite having a large poor population of its own, Brazil is becoming a major foreign aid 
donor.  During Lula’s last two years in office, Brazil’s annual aid expenditures tripled, reaching 
about $4 billion in 2010, which as a Guardian article notes, is roughly the equivalent of what 
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established Western donors like Canada and Sweden spend.253  Contrasting Brazilian foreign aid 
to China’s is useful in elucidating Brazil’s emphasis on soft power: The majority of Brazilian 
foreign aid goes to social, and agricultural programs while China’s focuses on building 
infrastructure projects in return for access to commodities.254   
 Brazil is well-situated to share best practices in social development, agricultural research 
and public health management with developing countries.  Bolsa Familia, a conditional cash 
transfer program, has diminished rural poverty in the Northeast of Brazil and narrowed the 
national income gap.  As an upshot of the program’s success, Brazil has adopted it as a model for 
its poverty reduction efforts abroad.255   
 As a leader in biofuels and agricultural technology, Brazil is a valuable source of 
expertise for developing countries with tropical climates.  This is currently taking place in 
several African countries: The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), in 
tandem with the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), monitor food security programs in 
Mozambique, Senegal, and Mali.  According to Embrapa’s website, its transfer of technology 
and worker training in cassava, cotton, cashew, and biofuel production is worth approximately 
$2.8 million.256  In Mali, in particular, Embrapa has contributed to “soaring” cotton 
production.257  Moreover, Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction conglomerate and a large investor 
in African infrastructure, is the largest private sector employer in Angola.  In Liberia, Odebrecht 
is working to repair that country’s railway system, and has done so using 75% Liberian labor, 
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while “training teams of engineers, technicians and accountants to help run its offices.”258  This 
“diplomacy of generosity”259 is a boon for Brazilian soft power and stands in marked contrast to 
China’s public works projects in Africa, which employ mostly Chinese workers, and has 
employed heavy-handed treatment of workers.260 
 Having deterred the spread of AIDS domestically through successful public policies, 
Brazil’s strategy for combating the disease has been replicated across the globe. In his memoir, 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso recounts that in 1990, the UN estimated that Brazil could 
have up to 1.2 people infected by 2002.261   Cardoso’s administration implemented an aggressive 
public sex education campaign and encouraged Brazilian pharmaceutical firms to produce 
generic versions of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs).  This vexed U.S. trade officials and prompted 
them to file a complaint in the WTO claiming that Brazil was in violation of intellectual property 
rights.  
 According to Cardoso, Brazil assembled a coalition of support for its position on generic 
ARV production, and worked to curry public opinion in its favor.  In 2001, UN agencies passed 
resolutions declaring access to generic drugs to be a human right, and after the 2001 UN AIDS 
Conference, the U.S. dropped its trade complaint against Brazil.   
 Furthermore, Brazil led the charge in the WTO in negotiating a compromise to the Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) clause in order to protect human lives.  That 
effort produced agreements which “affirmed, in principle, the right of countries...to issue 
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compulsory licenses to improve access to ARVs.”262  As evidence of Brazilian soft power, other 
developing countries, including India, South Africa and Thailand emulates Brazil’s defiant 
stance and followed suit in issuing compulsory licenses allowing generic drug production.263 
 Illustrative of the success of Brazil’s fight against AIDS, in 2002, just .3% of the 
population was infected.264  And in recognition of its triumphant national AIDS program, Brazil 
received the Culture of Peace award in 2001 and the Gates award in 2003.265 
 Brazil’s effective domestic campaign against AIDS and efforts to universalize access to 
ARVs266 make it a valuable contributor to global efforts to combat the disease.  Together with 
UNAIDS, Brazil founded the International Centre for Technical Cooperation on AIDS (ICTC) in 
2005, an agency which has worked to establish a network of AIDS service providers in 
developing countries and bolster states’ capacity to combat the disease.  The ICTC has become 
an integral part of the global AIDS fight and in 2008, UNAIDS renewed its agreement with the 
Brazilian government “to continue their cooperation on providing technical support to countries 
in strengthening and scaling-up national responses” to AIDS via the ICTC.267  According to Lee 
and Gomez, Brazil’s contribution to building disease-fighting capacity and impact on states’ 
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public health policies through its engagement with international organizations, has “increased the 
country’s ability to leverage soft power influence.”268 
 
South-South Partnerships: The G20 as a Vehicle for Restructuring the Bretton Woods 
Institutions 
 Under President Lula’s leadership, Brazil has leveraged its growing economy to push for 
a greater role in global trade and finance governance for itself and emerging market countries.  
Brazil’s leadership in the international economy has been particularly prominent in the Doha 
round of trade negotiations and in the wake of the 2008 global recession, which revealed Brazil 
and other emerging market countries’ economic resilience relative to the U.S. and European 
Union.  Reflecting a realignment of global economic strength toward emerging markets, which 
has become more pronounced since the global economic downturn, the G20, a coalition of 
developed countries and emerging markets, has replaced the G8 as the forum for global 
economic decision making.  Moreover, within the context of emerging market countries’ 
increased impact on global economic and financial decision making, Brazil stands out as a key 
interlocutor in lobbying for what former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim refers to as “moving 
the tectonic plates of world politics.”269  
 During the Doha Round (which began in 2001 and centered around improving the 
economic benefits of trade for developing countries) Brazil “won praise for its leadership role 
and consolidated its reputation as a tough but pragmatic negotiator.”270  It “spearheaded the 
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creation of the G20 developing nations in Cancún in 2003 to strengthen their negotiating power 
within the WTO”271 and along with India, led the developing world’s attempts to secure 
reductions in U.S and EU agricultural subsidies, which stymie exports from developing 
countries.  During talks hosted in Geneva in 2004, after the breakdown of negotiations in Cancún  
in 2003, those two countries had reached a tentative agreement on the reduction of farm 
subsidies with the U.S. and the EU.  The U.S., however, expected some reciprocity from 
emerging markets, and when India and China proved inflexible on reducing protections for small 
farmers, negotiations stalled.   
 Although, in solidarity with G20 countries, it favored allowing developing countries 
facing influxes of imports to skirt tariff reductions for certain products, Brazil, in contrast to 
India and China’s intransigence, demonstrated pragmatism and supported a deal proposed by 
IMF Director Pascal Lamy under which it would have reduced its industrial tariffs by 56% in 
exchange for the U.S. lowering its annual agricultural subsidies to $14.5 billion.272  That effort 
failed, however, as other emerging markets refused to compromise.273 
 According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Brazil has acted as a “natural leader” in 
the G20 led efforts to reform international financial organizations in the wake of the 2008 global 
economic downturn.274  Brazil and emerging market countries have pushed for increased voting 
weight in the IMF and World Bank. The G20 thus advocated for a merit-based reform of the 
selection process for the election of those organizations’ directors (the U.S. has traditionally 
managed the World Bank, while Europe has directed the IMF).  Exemplifying its leadership role 
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in the process of reforming global economic governance after the crisis, before the 2008 G20 
meeting in Washington, Brazil hosted a meeting of BRIC finance ministers in São Paulo, in 
which the four countries developed a joint position on the need for more regulation of 
international financial markets, coordinated government action, and greater participation for 
emerging market countries in resolving the crisis.  In order for emerging market countries to 
strengthen their participation, the ministers agreed that the Bretton Woods organizations needed 
to be reformed to account for those countries’ growing economic importance.275   
 Those positions gained traction and after a 2010 meeting in Korea, the G20 sanctioned a 
groundbreaking restructuring of the IMF which acknowledged the shift in distribution of global 
economic power toward emerging market countries.  The IMF implemented the agreed upon 
changes in 2011.  As an IMF document notes, the Board of Governors agreed to double 
members’ quotas (financial contributions which determine voting share).276  That agreement is a 
nod to the increased economic weight of emerging market countries, and will put Brazil, China, 
India, and Russia within the top ten shareholders in the organization.277   
 Brazil and emerging market countries also succeeded in reforming the World Bank, 
including an $86.2 billion increase in capital and 3.13% rise in the voting power278 for 
“Developing and Transition Countries” (DTCs) within the bank’s development wing, The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).279  As Brands notes, Brazil’s 
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conversion of its growing economic power into increased voting share in the IMF and World 
Bank is in large part a result of the Lula administration’s activism in the G20.280  
 
BRIC  
 In line with the Worker Party’s third worldist roots, since 2003, the Lula Administration 
has emphasized buttressing diplomatic partnerships with emerging market countries to increase 
its economic autonomy and negotiating power relative to industrial powers.  The most significant 
of those are BRIC—with Russia, India, and China and IBSA—with India and South Africa.  The 
BRIC partnership has yielded some desired results.  Apart from its success in lobbying for 
reform of international organizations, relationships with BRIC countries, China especially, have 
provided Brazil with lucrative trading opportunities.  In 2009, China became Brazil’s largest 
trading partner.  With a slow economic recovery in the U.S. and financial turmoil in Europe after 
the 2008 crisis, China’s insatiable need for Brazilian soy, iron ore, and oil has boosted the 
Brazilian export sector and been a key driver of economic growth.281  China also became the 
leading foreign investor in Brazil in 2010, with between $12 and $20 billion invested in steel, oil,  
mining, transportation, and energy. 
 The asymmetries of economic relations with China are highly controversial in Brazil.  
Policy makers and industrial leaders are concerned about the upward pressure on the real against 
the Yuan and the dollar resulting from Chinese interventions in the foreign exchange market as 
well as the effects of influx of cheap Chinese goods on Brazil’s industrial sector.282  In addition, 
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industrial sector’s percentage of GDP fell to 15.5%, the lowest since 1947. 
Brazil’s industrial exports, while competitive, struggle to gain a foothold in the Chinese market, 
as state subsidies give domestic firms a distinct advantage.283  Recently, President Rousseff 
responded to concerns about deindustrialization in Brazil, levying an anti-dumping tax against 
Chinese steel imports.284  As trade with China becomes more antagonistic, analysts at the 
Council on Foreign Relations expect that the Rousseff administration will emphasize ties with 
the U.S.285 
 As emerging market countries, China and Brazil have a shared interest in redistributing 
power within international economic organizations.  China’s support of joint BRIC positions was  
key in the successful effort to increase those countries voting power in the IMF and World Bank. 
However, China’s value as an ally has its limits.  In contrast to a receptive response from 
European countries and other emerging markets such as India, Russia, and South Africa, China 
remains unwilling to endorse Brazil’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat.   
 
IBSA 
 Its partnership with India and South Africa, in Brand’s estimation, could be the most 
important coalition of Brazil’s South-South’ diplomacy, as it unites the largest three democracies 
in the developing world which combined account for 1.4 billion people and a GDP of more than 
$3 trillion.286  The three states are also multicultural, multiethnic societies which share internal 
development challenges such as reducing poverty and improving tax collection; IBSA members 
view the forum as a center for sharing their own best practices on those issues with other 
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developing countries.287  Aside from fostering trade ties between the three states, which the 
group hopes will total $25 billion by 2015, IBSA cooperates on security—the group conducted 
joint naval exercises in 2008--and development projects in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau.288  Other 
developing states have solicited IBSA funding.  Laos, for instance, sought assistance with 
watershed management, while Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana have requested funds for 
youth centers.289 
 The IBSA forum also promotes member cooperation on structural reform of Post War 
international economic and security organizations.  All three members acted as representatives of 
the South’s interests during the Doha round, thus enhancing their credibility among the 
developing world.  India and Brazil, both major contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, have 
also worked together on Security Council reform, and along with Germany and Japan are part of 
the G4, a coalition which seeks to expand the Council from fifteen to twenty-five members.290  
 To pass, the G4 initiative would need two-thirds support—128 countries out of 193 in the 
General Assembly and would also require amending the UN Charter.  That would mean that two-
thirds of UN members would also have to ratify those changes in their capitals.291  Furthermore, 
the initiative would need the unanimous approval of the five permanent Council members.  
Steward M. Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations notes that the G4 currently has the 
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backing of 100 states in the Assembly, and that the 128 mark is within reach; gaining the support 
of all permanent members remains the challenge, as China remains vehemently opposed to its 
Asian rivals (Japan and India) obtaining permanent seats.292 
 
South-South Diplomacy and Human Rights Policy: A Threat to Soft Power? 
 The legitimacy and moral authority of states’ foreign policies is a key determinant of soft 
power.293  It follows, then, that Brazil’s long tradition of adherence to international laws and 
norms and leadership in promoting democratic governance, international cooperation, and 
peaceful solutions to conflict have buttressed its soft power.    
In the same vein, illegitimate policies can detract from states’ soft power.   For example, 
in his discussion of the Bush administration’s foreign policies and soft power, Nye holds that the 
U.S.’s  unilateral response to 9/11, culminating with the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
fomented anti-American sentiment.  This damaged U.S. legitimacy and undermined American 
security as it became politically risky for some foreign leaders to cooperate with the U.S. on 
counter-terrorism.    
 In his fervent efforts to build an axis of support in the developing world for Brazil’s 
permanent accession to the Security Council, President Lula compromised a fundamental tenant 
of soft power by weakening Brazil’s position on human rights.  This was most evident in Brazil’s 
courtship of Iran.  During Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s visit to Brazil in 2009, 
Lula advocated a diplomatic solution to Iran’s controversial nuclear program and voiced his 
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opposition to economic sanctions sought by the Security Council.294  Furthermore, Lula lauded 
Iran’s support of its candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council and neglected to 
speak of its violent response to protests over allegedly fraudulent elections. 
 In 2010, Brazil in conjunction with Turkey, sought to exploit its growing economic and 
diplomatic relationship with Iran to negotiate a nuclear fuel-swap deal whereby Iran would ship 
about half of its nuclear fuel to Turkey for enrichment in return for a medical research reactor in 
order to assure the peaceful use of that material.  The U.S. viewed Brazil and Turkey’s efforts 
skeptically and as having the potential to delay sanctions and “derail a fragile international 
consensus to increase pressure on Iran.”295   
 According to one critic, the Lula Administration’s “anachronistic” stance on human 
rights  signaled to the West that it “would be wise to keep that chair [at the Security Council] on 
hold.”296  Brazil’s position on Iran is a major part what has kept the U.S. from out rightly 
supporting its admission as a permanent Security Council member.  The Obama administration 
has voiced support for India’s accession; in contrast, while praising Brazil’s increased role in 
global security and development has stopped short of endorsing its candidacy.297  Therefore, by 
failing to align itself with international human rights norms, Lula may have temporarily 
jeopardized his administration’s ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives. 
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 President Dilma Rousseff, once a political prisoner, during Brazil’s military dictatorship, 
has taken a tougher stance on Iran.  In March 2011, the Rousseff administration voted in favor of 
a UN resolution to send a human rights investigator to Iran, thus marking a departure from 
former President Lula.298  It is too early to determine the extent of that departure, however, as 
Brazil has sent mixed messages with its positions at the UN, recently opposing measures to 
increase pressure on the Syrian regime.  Brazil also failed to support the protection of Libyan 
civilians from imminent in mass murder in  Libya by abstaining on Security Council Resolution 
1973.  Security Resolution 1975,299 which like Resolution 1973300 reaffirmed the UN mandate to 
protect civilians, confoundingly, received Brazil’s support. Thus, Brazil’s position on human 
rights and the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians when states are 
incapable or unwilling do so remains muddled.  Furthermore, it is unclear whether Brazil, if it 
were to become a permanent Security Council member, would contribute to that institution’s 
capacity to defend human rights. 
Conclusion 
 
 Charles de Gaulle once declared that Brazil is “not a serious country.”301 In a recent 
edition of 60 Minutes, host Steve Kroft noted that Brazil has a reputation for squandering its vast 
potential, and recalls the saying that “Brazil is the country of future and that always will be.”302  
Yet sixteen years of policy continuity from Cardoso to Lula followed by the 2010 democratic 
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election of President Dilma Rousseff, a technocrat, along with the resilience of the Brazilian 
economy to the 2008 economic downturn suggests that Brazil now enjoys stable democratic 
governance303 and is reaping the rewards of domestic reforms.  Its newfound stability has 
allowed Brazil to concentrate on poverty reduction; redistributive yet pragmatic government 
social policies have lifted thirty million Brazilians from poverty into the lower-middle class. 
 Brazil has leveraged its economy and soft power—which it derives from its successful 
domestic social policies and distinguished diplomatic history of promoting international 
cooperation and peaceful conflict—to project regional and international leadership.  In Latin 
America, Brazil has acted as a crisis manager.  It contributed to the resolution Ecuador and 
Peru’s border dispute, and the protection of democracy in Paraguay, and now commands the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), hence demonstrating its commitment to 
maintaining regional peace and security.  Brazil has also been pivotal in making Latin America 
free of nuclear weapons.  It established a bilateral nuclear inspection regime with Argentina and 
which rebuilt trust between the two states and led both to abandon their nuclear weapons 
programs.  Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was also instrumental in convincing Cuba to 
renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons and sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco.  Brazil also 
spearheaded regional economic and political integration efforts.  Brazil has also deepened 
economic ties with the region and become an important source of credit and investment.  Yet 
while Brazil is undoubtedly the de facto leader in Latin America, its neighbors remain distrustful 
of its ambitions and oppose its bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council.  
 On the international stage, Brazil covets permanent membership on the UN Security 
Council and has sought to demonstrate its competence through its command of MINUSTAH and 
proactive role in other UN peacekeeping missions.  Using its own social programs as a model, 
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Brazil has also amplified its soft power through foreign aid.  In global economic governance, 
Brazil positioned itself at the forefront of the G20 and led developing countries’ efforts to obtain 
better terms of trade during the Doha Round.  It also played a major part in emerging market 
countries’ successful campaign to restructure the IMF and World Bank in their favor.  
 The soft power which Brazil derives from the legitimacy of its domestic and foreign 
policy is paramount to its continued leadership in international affairs.  That said, ensuring that 
those policies adhere to widely shared values, such as human rights, is imperative.  Domestically, 
Brazil must continue to address its dysfunctional legal system, correctional institutions, and 
police force.  Furthermore, Brazil tarnishes its own image by honing economic and diplomatic 
ties with rogue states such as Iran.  The reason for Brazil’s fluctuating postures on human rights 
votes at the UN is likely due to its multifaceted identity as a leader of the South and a bridge 
between North and South.304   In order for Brazil to maintain its strong soft power fundamentals, 
President Rousseff should further clarify Brazil’s position on sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention and exploit her own experience as a victim of torture during Brazil’s military 
dictatorship as a lever to ensure Brazil’s unequivocal support of human rights and democracy. 
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